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DlTRODUCTIOB

The morali.t is interested in hUJlWl acts.

His first task, at course, is

to determine what calst1tutes a moral or human act. 'rom there he proceed. to
establ1.h the diYi.ian ot moral action into the good and ertl. This task i.
not • ..,..

Preacinding fraa the tine point. ot .1uqinC about anT calcrete act,

it is ditticult enough merely to untangle in thoupt all of the el_ents which
enter into the uke-up ot a buaaan act ca'lsid.ered abetractly.

Be.ides the

object ot the act its eirenastanees aut be taken into account. and

801'11

these eire_stances the most important is the end tor which the action w••
pertormed.1 low it is an act or the will which bq rec.i.,..d the

n._

intentio

which brings this Jlod:1f'71ng circums'tance into tbe structve at a h,.. act.
Con.equent17 the moralist IlU8t be especially interested in the act ot intention.
He can be interested in it traa either of two nnpoint..

Since ,it i.

"

it.elf an act, he 11&7 cQ181der it. coodDess or malice, and in thi. oae. he aak.
himself what tollows it an intention is good and what follow. it the intention
is evil. !hus the tirst ri.enrpo1nt regards tbe .0l"8.l state of the intention anel
the Wluence this haa upon the moral state of an act.

The second, howewer,

tocuses on the entitative state of the intention to ask what ettect this hal
upon the moral value of an act. Then the moralist consider'S what tollows
when an intenti()ft i8 actual, or virtual, or habitual.

-------

r
Yii
The con.ideration of the act of intention traa this second 'Viewpoint torws
the content of thi. thesi..

A study ot the tirst consideration tall. outside

it ••cope, and the cmclu.ions ot that ccosideration will be pres.ed throughout the the.i ••
Though the physical nature of the act of intention in all of it. three
state. will be inve.ti,ated and detel'a1ned, the principal a1J1 ot this the.is i.
to establish the nature of the virtual intention.

What doe. it ..an to say

that an act 1s produced 'Under the intluence ot a virtual. intention? thus runs
the que.tion whioh was uppermost in the mind of the author .hen he began his
search through the works of St. Tbca&&.

I .....rtb.l••• , thi. queeticn could not

pos.ibly be 8l1pered without a knowledge of the nature of intentim pure and
.1aple, aucll l ••s without knowing What is .eant b7 an actual 1ntentian.

lor

oould cae t.el _tiatied that he knew clearly and distinctly tbe nature of a
y1rtual intention as Img .. he telt Uftcertain about the physioa1 nature of

tbe habitual intention.

Th.refore this

thea~.

lends itself to a natural divi-

sion into three parts' a oon8iderati(l1 of the 'actual intending ot an end, a
oCMl81deration of an habitual intentim of an end, and floa11y a ooosideration

at a virtual intention of an end.
The innuenoe of the babitual and virtual intentiOll upon the .orality of
an act will aleo be 8'\udied, beeause this . . .s a natural corollary to verity
the oonc1usions _de about the physioal nature of those type. ot intention and
to olar1t7 those . .e oonolusions.

In point ot tact, 1t ..... that the oril'""

1nal qaeatiOll motiYating researoh into this .hole prahl_ of

nnw

intention

oould not be ccmpletely .atiatied unless the aoral wnuence were al.o explained.

Th. discussien, on the other hand, of the aoral 1Dtluence of the actual

viii
intantiCl1 could nat. be included in this stud1 for the a1a both at brev1tyand
at unity.

A. mentioned, the 'Viewpoint whioh would oon.e1der intentiQ'l according

to it. goodne•• or badne••

ft.

purpo..l.y excluded frca th1. th.sis! to consider

the aoral. iDtlwmc. of the actual :l.ntention would be nothing el.. , how....r, but
a stuclJ of the conaequcce. of a good or a bad intent1CXl
act-. study' which :in itself can inTolT• •ore tban
In addition to intention other act.

&

GIl

the .ora11t7 of an

th.ai ....length expositi••

ot tbe will, aamel7, volition,

trui-

tion, and eleet:1on, will briefly enter the picture in order to highlight the
nature of 1ntent1on.

Attention and intensity alao, the nature of habit, of

prud.eDoe and the other aoral T,lrtue., and a di,cllasion of the

1n~rpretative

intention t1g\ll'8 ill the e.xplanaticm of the subject of the the.is.

But, intel'-

eniDg aa 1t II1ght be to delve turther into each <me of these topic., and
othera, their place in thi. study has to be l1a1ted.
c~.on

un,.

Thu., one could puraue a

of the various act. in which the rill and the Ha.<m Idngle, such
~e

could. trace the growttl and

mt.Dt1_.

The varioue usage. of the

aa counsel, election, ccaaand, and intent1C1l:.J or

"

subsequent use of the tera

~terpr.tative

word :int_tion offer fruitful prospects of inquir.r.

A d1scU8sim of the difte

ent type. of attention which one II1ght conceivabl,. ex.rci.e (explicit and 1m.1ioit, renexive and direct, etc.) is another intriguing que.ticm. All of
the.. probl. ., if they are brought in at all, will be kept carefully in their
proper relaticm to the subject . .tter of this thesis.
Ho one, to the knOll'ledge of the author, hal a. :yet conducted a aaaplate
inqu11"7 into the pqa1cal nature

ot the three kind. ot intention traditional17

calle4 actual, 'Virtual, and habitual..

Suar•• , .urel;y, _de .cae atud;y of the.e

ix

three, but his was not a complete one. 2 In recent times there have been saae
investigation. of

Sf;.

ThOllU' use of intention, taken in general.

'lb. first

was a atudJ by B. D. Siaanin of the various meanings of the word, together with

short explanatiClls of the difference between st. Thoaa.' early usage of the
term and hi. later U8~ge.l

Thea Ir. Andr8 Hayen, S.J., undertook a study' of

intentional being, which pertain. to the act1"'1ty ot the intellect rather than
to that of the will, hOlRWer, intenUon, the act of the will, . . explained at
great length and 1t. clo.ene•• to the intention :1avol",ed 1n intelleoticm indicated. h F1n&l.l;y, Dca Odon Lott:1n, O.B.B., baa 1I&de. an hiator:1cal reYielf at
Scholutic ettort., tna Abelarcl to $t;. ThQlaa, to explain the moral effect ot

S The treataent of the three ')'pea ot intention aa

good and bad intention••

found in the Catholic ,.,.,l9P!ed.1a and other dioticarie., in var:toq textbOOka of paycholoa and ethic., and in a variev of aoral theology manual•

.further justifie. the claia that no other author has aa yet undertaken a ..tilttactor1ly complete expol1t1ca of the act ot

~tenUcn.

The author hopeI that the follOWing chapm8 will aa tar .s lies within
hi. cap'tenee le:rYe that t\1DCtion.

4. De Bonitate et Mel!tia Huu.the Qpera OiiIilla, ed. D. it. lDar;r-

2ne JJl:Umo 'ine BOIIin1e, d.1ep. II, seetio

nor. iCtWll( hap. VI, ••ot10 5. Found

e'ii'is,

i8~6J, If.

in

·

3B. D. S1Ilonin, O.P. t aLa notion d'p1tent10 dana l'08UYre de S. Thomas
dt'quin,· ltSPT. XII (1910J, 445-~1.

4Andr8

1:Iqen, S.J., L'Intentimmel Salon. Saint 1h..... 2nd .d., reTised
and corrected (Brq." 19JJi).
' .

S

Odan Lott1n, O.a.I., P870hOl0eie et .orale aux Xlle et XlIIe 81'ole.
(o.blOllZ, hlI1_, 1954), D;Jo~A..

OHAPTER I
DTEITIOI AID ACTUAL DTENTIOI
...t lea,.. tra Soorate. on phUoaopher. have tOlilJld it u..tul to b.gin an

lDT.,U,aUcm 'b7 exaain:lng the ••aa:lna of the teN or tera, to

oe

u,ed.

Th.refore it i • .fittin, '\0 begin \he pr.sent 1nqui1'7 into the nature of intention with lea. inc.tJ.ca'lionl ot the ,8Ileral. um1ng

or

the tera.

f!.rat. of all, the word. int_tiC!. .t7JI01ogicall7 ,ign1tie. a directing

taarard, a .t:retching toward, an inolinatiOJ'l '\onrd.. !! int_d equTalently
1
is ,qmg !!.l!!!
,-.~ ~la..
Oon.equentl1' two notes are included in

:u.

the conc.pt. the tir,t, that of a ctyn_ic diapo,itianJ the ,eecmd, that of
direction.

fbe fil"1t characteriltic provide, the clue which leada to a kn __

ledge of the prmcipl. of thi. act.

detera1A•• the

~

The .ec~d, ,ipit1ed b7 the prefix ~,

d1apoai'iion, Dot

.....,. trc:a it. object, b1&t

Ol'lll' b7 apl1citl.7 den7ins or it aotiCl1

07 japl,-1nl that this object i . separated £:rca
the d1llaad.c pr1Bciple D,. 80M di.tmoe. 2 ru. 1JIp11caticm later will .erve
allO

ae a rea1nder that 1ntentian dUter, traa c.rtain other operations at the

s•• dJnaaio prlDclpl••

lJil II Set., l8, 1, l 101., "Ir1tendera erd.a dicitur quasi in aJ.1ud. tendere.--!,.T:;-l=II, 12, 1 en tlIteapondeo dicendua quod mten'Uo, .ieut 1p_
n __ .Oftai, aip1t1cat D &liquid tend.ra. II
2Da Ver., 22, 13, obj. lSI tllTaeter.., !ntentio est distanti, a tine,

haec

-

eiiIil praep08itio in d1stantiam iRlportat."
1

2

One might liken the act ot intention to a pursuit of a thing.)

For the

subject intending is striving to arrive at or reach 8omething. Again becauae
of the notiCll

at distance iaplied in the preposition

!!!.,

one is not said to

intend it the eftort to attain ia directed to the object ia.ediately I ·Per hoo
aut_ quod dicitur in al1qu1d \endere, 1aportatur quaecBm d1stant1a Ul1us
in quod &l1quid tenditJ et ideo quando appetltus tertur u.ediate in aJ.1qutd,

non dicltur es.. intentio 1111118, ai...e hoc sit t1l1i& talt1ll118, 81...e ait aliquid
ad tinea ultia_J sed quando per un_ quod y1Ilt in 411ud pervenue nititur,
1l1ia in q11Od. perTeDire nititur d1citur esa. intentio.""
An analy8.1. ot the tU'lll itselt leads to 1et another bit of intol'll8.tion.
lor

~cl1n1n1

or tendina tward s.ethmg can reter to t;wo tnes at subjeots.
toward a thiDg, a8 weU .. the mot1e ot that

The action of the . , . t

~d.a

which tile agent mewes.

Becauae the latter' & unitestl,. depends upon the agent t a

80\iOl1 or action, intending ia priaarU,. the tunction ot the agent, aecondar1l:r
that of the .obile being. S
10ir thoqh St. Thous proceeda frOll this ::di8tinoticc to deduce the dJ'naa:l.c
source at intention, his prinoiple Ilight serve another purpoae. lor, sinoe
the notion

or

directing or being directed toward 1s general enough, it is not

aurprising to find that the word i8 eapl07ed to expres8 various idea,.

There-

fore 8eae natural 8ch_e of div1sicm will help to ola..U1 and order those

)IB n Sent., ibid •• "Intendere aut. in allquid est iUius potentia.
ad quailpertlii'ii prosequi velfugere aliqu1d." !?!. ~., !!!!., 2 in centr.:
"Praeterea, intendere est quoddaa prosequi."

4Jn

-

--

II Sent., ibid.

r
)

u.age..

An :in1t1al div1.10n can be made into proper application and derived

application, where by ·proper" is aeant "in accord with the general .en.e,"
and by "'derived'" i8 meant "according to a figure of speecb. '" !hen, i t one utiUse. tbe d:1.atinctiClD between pr1aar,y and .econdary application, where "primar'y·
refer. to an active subject and ".eccadary'" indicates a pa.a1ve .ubject, the
proper applicatiClD at tbe tara
dar;y.

:1D~tiOJ1

further div1des into primary and secan-

Thi. seh. . of div1.i_ arrange. tbe various .en... 1n whicb st. Tb. . .

-.pl.01. the word 1I1ten'1!m.

St. fhou.. use.

Ibat the.. san... are will now be indicated briefly

in~tion

in a proper and priaary sen.e to Ilea attention,

intenait,. or intenaion, 6 and tbe wl11's act ot intending.

In each ot th•••

instanc•• tbe tel"ll 1. properly used, tor by !lttentlon i. lleant a directing towarde ot the oopoeolt1v. taoulty ot the soul, by intens1ClD ls lIleant a ....h_ent
directing towards, anel by e1ntent1<lO 1. aeant the directing toward. of the
appet1t1.... faculty ot the .oul.

Sinc. each ot the three inTolve. the not1Cl1l ot

an act1v. aubject, the applicat10n in all 1.~al.o primal'7.
lrat_t1~

is used 111 a proper bat .eoaadtii-y sen.e when 1t .ign1t1e.

1n.truIIlental aot1on, or inatruaental V1rtu•
1ndicated, but the .ubjeot 1. cmsidered

&8

.7

'or here a direction towards 1.

a pa••1ve .UBject.

So, tor example,

the saw 11'1 the hand. at a carpenter po••••••• an intention, but only inasaucb
as 1t 1s being wielded by the am and hand

ot the ca1'1*lter.

fhe d.rived application occurs when intent10n .tand. tor that which i. 1:0

6Ct • Ha,-en, pp. 48, 161-164, 170-174J S1acn1n, pp. 447-448. The former
ae•• to take intension and intensity as two specif1cally different uaages,
but the two teras are related a. the ooncrete and the ab.tract are related.
7Bayen, pp. 48, 167, Simonin, pp. 448-4,1 ..

4
some W&7 the object

or

an incl1natiCl1, rather than in inclinatim itself.

Under

thi. usage bela'll tho.. cases in which St. ThOJlAB speak. of cognoscitive epecies·

and the purpo.e, or goal, ot the ..U1. 9 'or the intentional specie. do not
receiTe their name becauae thel are inclined to sanething el.e. 10 lor doe. an
author's intention in writing a book incline to seaething else, rather, it
draws

OIl

the author b7 its appetibUit7.

fbi. the us is interested directly
terent types of intention

&.

in

atud71ng m17 ene of

St. 1'h.... coneeived thart.

~e..

s1% dif-

Yet allot the others

will increa•• 1B mtell1gibil1t7 as a rePl.t at the restricted ettort, 811d two

ot the, attentien and inten.icz, approach

80

near17 the act of :1ntentiClll that

the7 aqt eater the oc.p1ete p.,-oho1og1oal pict.v.re of that act.

1'8e 1Wt&:1ncter

of the present ohapter will be clevot.ecl to expla1nlllg thla aet of intending b7 an
anal7.i. ·01 st. 1b.aus' deaoription of 1t.
Be expres.17 deala with the ..tter in three ..orks which range orer a large
~ ~

Sm'tellce., ..r1:tten traa
,
l2S4 to 1156, fOrlll1alates his fun eli_uss1m Of the subject. U. NtU'D8 to
port.1on of his writ:b:lC career.

The OQlllentaq

the act ot 1ntentim in the D18J>!ted. Question!!!

8Ha7en , pp. 111-189, SiJaQllm, pp.

1'l'U~,

Which are dated at the

456-460.

9lfa7en, p~ 48; he diacems enough difterence between "design, purpose- cd
"thoqht. senae (..hat the author ..ant. to s..,.)- to aake of th_ .eparate appUcation. of intention. 1'h1. seema _ unnecesa&r7 retin__t. In II Seat., 38,
hp. textus expiiins' "Intent10, proprie loquendo, act_ YOluntat1s 8Iii1t1cat,
ut dict'Oll en; sed tin.. nm sign1ticat n1si aa'terlallter nOlllen . . .tur, ut
scilicet s. .tv intentict'" pro re intenta, sicut et tide. nmitur pro re cred1-

ta.-

lODe. fer., 21, ), ad SI "(el. dicitur. 'Finis prior .st in intentione, •
1ntentio-s.itur pro actu mentis, qui est intendere. Cum aut. comp&raaua
intenti<mea bGni at veri, intent10 sUlllitur pro ratione quaa eign1t1cat definit10J unde aequiToca accipitur utrob1que. tt

period. tJ'Oll 12$6 to 1259. )'!nally, in the two 7HZ'll 1269 and 1270, he 1___
ll
riaed and ordered hia thouant in the f;1Jaa :oiecnmdae ot the !!!!:! theolOlica.
The COIIIIl81tarz &aka in two article. whether intention il an act at the w1ll, and

whether the Will in oo.e and the a..e act 111:1.11. the end and the .eana to

~.

end.

The Ilj,aputed Queationl oanuder alaoat the identical two qUltion., except that
the 18Cond il rephraaeel tbua'
and 'rill the llean• .,,,12 The

-Doe, the will ill the .... Ilotian intend the end

s.u

inquir.. about th'e point•• whether intent1an

il the intellect' a act or the rill'l, whether it ia 01117 ot the last end,
whether a man oan intend two thines at once, whether intention ot the end 11 the
.... act aa the vollt1. of a meana, aid whether ut.lt1cn baloaga to brutea.
All three looa"ian"

tien

aD.

then, begill with the t_claaental qu.lt1Cl1l, "Ie 1nten-

act ot the will, or nott- The worela ot the

~

give • clear an_I'"

- [IJntentio, 11cut ipa. ncaen aonat, a1gn1t:1cat in allq1l1<l t_der..

aut_ tencl1t et actio aewentil, et motu .ob111..
aliquid tend1t, ab actione Iloyenti,

In aliquid

Sed hoc quod motue aobi11l in

proced1t.~Un.

intenUo priao et priDc1pa,
liter p4tJ"tinet aci iel quoc! aoyet ad t1DaI.l uncle:: cl101aua aroh1tectol"., et an_
praeo1p1ent., aoyere .uo iaper.1oalloa ad 1el quocl1p..

utendi".

folunt ..

11The datinc here i. a. found in Wah' a chroDolol1, C1.en in VerDon J.
Bourke'l lntroductioo. :!:2 !h! Workl !!.!!. J.baau Aquinaa (lew Yom, 1948),
pp. xii-xiii.
12

In the atandard editionl conlulted, the title to the article (.E! !!!:.,
22, 14) il given all "Utrua 'Volmtaa eodem motu velit tinem et intendat ea quae
sunt ad tin_.· fhat thie stat_ct ooo.ta:ina an accidental inver.ion at 'Verb.
il clear trca the entire text of the article, where the question really diecusled 11 ae tranalated above. The phruiD, in the other locationl' ·lJtrlD inte: l0tio tini. lit 1_ actus Cllll Tol_ute eius quod eat ad tinea,· (.!.!., I-U, 12,
I.), -lItr_ 't'oluntaa mo et eodea act. ".lit tin_ et ea quae 8mt ad tin_,"
(~ II !!!1., l8, 1. 3).

r

I

6
aut_ movet canes aliu Tires aDiIlae ad finem, ut aupra habit. e.t.

Unde aani-

fest- est quod m\eD.tio proprie eat actus Tolunta.tis.·13 Here the proof is
taken frca the will ta prilll&17 role, it. prillac:r, Dong .an'a powers as the

source of actiCll1. 14 The et,.olog1oal roots ot the word have directed the in-

quir7 to SQle dynamic principle.

III the h\ll8n .uppos1te, this clear~ de.cribe.

the capacity andflJDCtion of the will. 15
The COlB8l1~ otfers the .... explanation.

For again the 'Y817 nae ot

thia act points out the pCIIJer to which it pertaiDs. Intendina seaething belong.
to the a.a faculty whioh dicta\ea tllght and pursuit. Bow which tacult,. i.
responsible when we nee or pursue . . .tbing! Cena1nl.7 not the speculative

It, heM_er, ;rev. an_v that the practical intellect dictatea night

intellect.

or pv.uit, s.h a replT doea aot expra•• the truth ex&etq.

Jlo, tha practical

:lnteUect judee. the actrisabU:i.tr of eithar action, but it 'belongs to the
appetite or w111 to execute Webt or purauit .16
f ... a diUerent point of new,
,
Yer1tate, in which the ar&-ent proceeds in teruat the

the . .a cCIlcluaiOll to the question,
is reached in the

E!

object of the intentim.

but-

The object is the good which is an end. But lood i.

alao the proper object of the will.

Thua an act (intention) and a power (the

will) have the ea. object. ICIIJ, .ince a pCIIJer ia related to an object 01117

13!.!_, ill.!!.
14Aap17 proven

in other 1ocat1cmsl e.

g., ~.!.,

I-II, 9, 1.

15,!?! !!l., 22, 12 c. "Sed movere per 1Iodum cauaae agentis eat v01\111tatis,
et nOll 1ntel1ectua ••• actus voluntatia e.t quaedam !nelinatio in aliquid,
nOD aut. actus 1n1lellectua. Incl1natio aut_ .at diepoaitio moventie
aecunda quod e:ttic1ene 8cmat."
16

~

II

!!!!!.,

)8, 1, 3 eol.

7
through its act, it the two agree in their object, the act in question belongs
to that power.
will.17

Theretore one must conclude that intention is an act of the

st. Thomas is not raising here a completely new argUlllentJ in an argu-

ment to the contrar,y preceding his reply in the COllllUDta!7 he already had retel"red to the same point. 1S

But in this passage he has seen tit to expand the idea

lor has it been cCIIlpletely taken for granted that the object of the in1& ntion is an end.

True enoug.'l, a whole tradition had preceded St. Thomas in which

philosophers used intention to describe the inclination of the Will to an end,
and in which they measured the aoral goodness of an intention partly from the
end. 19

It 11&1' have been in the context ot this tradition that st. Theaa.

formulated his division or the acts of the wUl to be considered in Questions
light to Seventeen in the

!.!:!:!!

Secundae. 20 HoweTer, in his ?ommentaq !!!.

!h!

Sentences he has undertaken some justification tor this common or traM tional
understanding of the word.

There he begins with what the preposition

!!!

im-

plie., n8llely, sCllle distance fram the object: to which something tends J on this
basis one cannot properly be said to int.end unless one seeks t.o attain sOllething
through another thing which one wms.

An intention is made ot that object one

seeks to attain, not or that which one immediately wills.

Since the immediately

desired object i. serTing as a. m.eans to the other, the latter is an end.

-Id

17De v:er., 22, 13 c.

--

18~ II Sent., 3B, 1, 3, 2 in centro
19Lott1n, PSlchologie

.!! Korale,

IV, 309-486.

20S•'1' ., I-U, 8, prologus: "Actus autem yoluntatis in finem videntur esse
tres • :-:- ." "They seem to be three, tI as it to say that analysis and traditional doctrine have ~uncovered more nor less.

8
autem quod est propter "

bonum et voli tum, est tinis ••21

Thus intention

designates an act ot the will for an end. 22
This is not to be understood as saying that an act
to the last end in &ll instances.
tiona fOmld among men?

or

intention must look

Otherwise how explain the diversity of inten-

No, there are two kinds of ends for the will.

One end,

called the last end, is arrived at when the 1Il01oioo of the will is completed.
The other type ot end is reached at the caaple1iion ot a part ot the total
motion. 23

Thus God is the last end of every .an in the universe; but each also

haa his own particular end to desire. 24
Consequently intention is always of an end. though not necessarily always

ot the last end. .\:Jut other acts of the will also bave the end as their object J
intention Iluat not be contu.aed with these.

Bet ore _rking the difference be-

tween intention, volit1cn, and fruition, however. another important element in
the act of intention must be examined.
act, and without it the will's act of

It belongs to the essence of the full
inten~g

an end cannot take place.

~'or

intention is Mactua voluntatis in ordine ad rationem" J M[n] on tamen est actus
voluntatis absolute, sed in ordme ad ratianaa. ft25

21.§..!., I-lI, 8, 2 c.

22~ II !!!!!., 38, 1, 3 sol.

23!.!., I-lI, 12, 2 c. For St. ThOll... the ultimate, or last, end was not
distinguished into ultimate amply and ultimate relatively, as is otten done by
authors todq.
241!! n ~., 38, 1, 1 sol.: .. (8]icut rerum omnia linUS est finis ult!mus,
scilicet Deus, ita et vol\D'ltatum omnium est unus ultlmus finis, soilicet DeUS)
nibilominus tamen sunt alli tines proxiJai. u
25
E! !!t., 22, 13 c.

9
The Commentarz briefly explain. and proves this requisite role ot reaacmJ

the text in the

E!

Veritate enlarges on this point to the extent that the entire

Bepl)" is cCXlcerned with this aspect) the Summa seems to presume that the matter
needs no further explanation or proot.

Fran the fact that the will tends to the

end through .aaething else which i . directed to the end, says St. !rhanaa in the
Canmentag, intentim itaplie. in its lIeaning an ordering of me thing to another
The function of ordering, however, pertain. to the intellect. 26 Thus intention
i. not an act ot the will absolutely, but as subordinated to and ordered by
reasoo. 27
An ordering ot one thing to another is essential to intentiOn.

To intend,

again, is to tend fran what one w111s to .omething else a. to an end.

The end

is that to which the means are refered; in willing the Ileans, the will also is
referred to the end.

But what arranges this reference of means to end!

Nothing else but the intellect, which sees that a certain thing, to which other
things lead, is a good.

Therefore when the

some .ort of ordered object.

~ill

begin. to act, its object 1,

Since ordering does not .tea trom the will '.

nature, but trom the intellect's, the act of intending proceed, trom a will
which is guided by reason. 28

26.!!! II

~.,

27 In

-Sent., 38, 1, 3 ad 5.

-

II

38 , 1, 3 sol.,;

!! !!t., 22, 13

c•

28E! !!r., 22, 1.3 c I "Cum ena voluntas moveatur in SUUDl obiectua sibi
propositum a ratione, diversimode movetur, secundum quod diversiBode sibi propooitur. Unde, C'Ulll ratio propanit sibi aliqu1.d ut absolute boo.um, voluntas
Dlovetur in 1l1ud absolute,; at hoc est velle. Cum autem proponit sibi &l1quid
sub ratione boni, ad quod alia ordinentur ut ad tin_, tmc tend! t :In illud
cum quodam. ordine, qui :lnvenitur in actu vo1untatis, non secundum propriam
natura, sed secundum exigentiam rations is • tt

10
This funotion of the intellect, obvious as it seems and casually as it may
be present.ed, assumes great importance infuture disoussion.

The explanation of

the natures of habitual and of virtual intention will d.epend a great deal on a
closer insight into the role of reasOll in the will's act of intending.

Further

inspection of this fmction will be worth while.
iirst or all, "the intellect has the ability to order a number of things
into sane unity.

The given in this case is the fact that men do understand a

number of things at the same time, a phenomenon which is impOssible unless one
intelJigible species, containing the plurality of objects obscurely,
fOMing the intellect.

WE.ll'8

in-

For the intellect to know two things at once, it has to

know the two as related, or under the aspect of related beings. 29
As a consequence of this capacity of the intelleot the will al,o can be

inclined to two or more things at once..
itself (i.e., not as

Ii

means but as a thing) and an ,end for itself.

desire the means and the end at the same
of the end.

Thus the will can desire a meana for

t1m~,

Or it can

willing the means for the sake

When it acts in this manner, its 1'Il.0tion doe.not stop with the means

and th Ell resume i te momentum toward the end, as th ough there were here two acts.

One Ca'ltinuous motion carries the will trail its original point of reat through
the means and up to the e.nd •.30
)

It is clear then that the intelleot ordera both the means to the end, and
the will also to the end.)l

29

~.!.,

I, 12, 10;

30~ II

~., .38,

The two arrangements are not made, however, in

58, 2; 85, 4J
1, 4 sol. and

~

II

ad 2)

~.,

!.!.,

38, 1, 4 sol.
I 12, 3 and 12,
I-I,

4.

31S.T., I-II, 12, .3 ad 21 flSed in quibuBdam intellectus ord1nans appetitlDll
in finei e,t conjunctuB ipsi appetitui. tt Cf. also In II ~., 38, 1, .3 sol.

11
the same way, as is

)mom

from a general acquaintance with the operations ot the

intellect and its relation to the will.

The intellect 'works with I t 'deals with

the intelligible aspects of things, learning of things as they are, and, finally
becoming one with the real existing beings through a dynamio intentional identification.

Thereupon the will can desire what is intentionally represented in

the intellect.

Since the will and intelleot belong to the same sUPPosit,l2 and

both Will and intellect are capable of reflection, the will haa the capacity to
desire thoae things which exist intentionally in the intellect. l3
ceiTing the end the intellect can propose the end to the will.

'!hus by can-

By seeing a

means and its end the intellect can propose this composite ordered object to the
rill.

In this manner, then, the intellect orders the means to the and and the

will to the end, tor the will follows the apprehensiCil
It was stated above I -By seemg

Ii

or reasm)4

means and its end the intellect can pro-

pose this composite ordered object to the will.·

Two aspects of the operation

of the intellect mU8t be noted and diatinguiehed in this stat_ent.

One, the

32De Ver., 22, 13, ad 7* "Ron tamen oportet quod intendere et velle sint
actus ern.deii potentiae, ouius est cognoecere, sed eiusdem suppositi t noo enim
proprie dicitur cogn08cere vel intendere potentia aliqua, sed suppo8itum per
potentiam..
33 cr• B! Ver., 22, 12 cJ S.T., I, 82, 4; I-II, 9, 1 and 3. The intentional
aspects of intellection descriDed in this paragraph should not be confused with
the act of intention of the will. For an extended analysis of the intellect' 8
intentional actiVity, the reader is referred to Fr. Hayen's book cited in the
Introduction of this paper.
l4ne Ver., 22, 4 Ot "Quod autem aliquid determinet sibi inclinationem in
finem, non- poteat contingere niai cognoacat finem, et habitudinem fini8 in ea
quae Sl.mt ad finemt quod est tantlllll rationis. Et ideo tali8 appetitu8 non
determinatua ex al1quo al10 de necessitate, sequitur apprehensionem rationi8J
unde appet1tua rationalis, qui voluntaa dicitur, est alia potentia ab appetitu
8enaibUi."

12
intellect 8ees !
ject.

~an!

!!!!! .!:!!~.

Two, the intellect !!.!!.

ject; it is paying attention.
here.

'!'hat is, it orders into one composite ob-

That is, the intellect is nttending to the obThe first of these two aspects is considered

Later, attentim, which is a propc.rty of any cooscious act of the intel-

l1ect, will be considered.

It need only be Observed here that ordering necessa-

rily is performed attentively, but that attention can be given without the
intellect necessarily ordering.

ThuB there is a distinction between the two

aspects.
This mutual relation
Thomas' eyes.

intellect and will was an important problem in St.

The a.rticle on 1ntenticn in the p! Veritate seems at pains to

emphasise the pOint.
~he

or

One could easily presume that the intellect's function in

act of intention is finished when it proposes to the will an intentional re-

presentat10n of, the thing to be willed.

But knowledge of this sort must precede

every act of the will, and so intention seems no different in this respect traza
other acts of the will.
His reply in the

~

St. Thomas foresaw '!Ihe difficulty and answered i t ) '

Veri tat! has already been 'seen, namely, that something which

is proper to reason appears in the act itself of the w11l.
is ordered; it

t~d$

The act of the w111

to its object with a certain order. 36

St. 1'hanas goeBon to explain this certain type of reason-directed order.
He notes the difference between active relation and passive relation.; an active
relation to an end is the function of realm, tor reason orders and directs} to
the will belcngs the function of being ordered to the end, and

35~ ~.r., 22,

]J, obj.

3.

36~., corpus; of. t..he quotation on p.9 above.

80

its relation

13
is passive. 37

Since intention i. properly an act of the will, it 1s the passive

relation that i8 found in intention.
At this juncture it is po.sible to witness a development in the theory of

st. Thcaas.

~eroas

in the

E.!.

Veritate he verge. frequently on the notion of

intention as an act not only of the will but als:> of the intellect, he does not
do

1I10re

than repeat constantly that, although something of the intellect is pre-

sent in the act of intending, nevertheless intention is an act ot the will.
the me hand he will say,

tI

On

Intending is an act of the will in subordination to

reason, tI and tithe Will has a type of act w'nioh belmgs to it inasmuch as the
influence of reason is left in the will, n and "there appears in the act of the
w111 what is proper to reason,"38 and "nothing prevents a single act trca. belonging to both rea.on and will, to one immediately, to the other mediately. fiI
On the other hand, he hopes all this will be satiefactorily explained by the

difference between the active and the passive relatiClls.
of the

!!!!! his

In the

~

Secundae

explicit statement once aca;1n goes no tarlher than to say the

intention is an act of the Will.

But, as for"the influence of the reason left

in the aot of the wUl, and the subordination to reason, and the other desorip-

tions ot the role of reason whioh are found in the
mention made.

E! _V_er_i_t_a_t_e,

there is no

At least three time. St. Thomas says the ordering ot reason

Erece?es in saae way the aot of the will, but that is all he aay• .39

In each

3 7De Ver., 22, 1), ad lJs ·(R)elatio in finem activa eat rationis= eius enim
est reterre1n tinem; sed relatio passiva poteat esse ouiuscumque direoti vel
re1ati in finem per rationem J et sio poteat 'esse voluntatis. Et hoc modo
relatio in finem. pertinet ad intentionem. fI Cf. also ~., ad 10 and ad 1.4.
)8

~.,

ad 3.

39 S.T., I-II, 12, 1 ad 1; ad 3; 3 ad 2.

case he 1s indicating that what 1s ordered 1s the will t 8 object, but not the
w111 t s act.

Thus he has changed his original picture of the will' 8 act a8 hav-

ing in it saaething of the intellect. Now his picture portrays the intellect's
function as presupposed to the act of the W111.

40

Comparison often serves to clarify uncertainty and to verity understanding.
Since all oJ: the elements essential to the will's act of intending an end have
now been delineated, the task of cOilparing thia act with other acts of the will
regarding the end for the purpoaes of enlightenment and verification presents no
problem.

low the question hinted at previously can be raised again and answer-

ed: "Sow does intending differ fraa voliticm and fruition?"

Atter this has been

dul1 settled, a p08sible source of contUsion, namely, the aot of eleotion, will
be taken up and explained.

st. Thomas indicates very clearly the difference between volition and intention.

In the former the end is willed immediately, in the latter soae medi...

intervenes between the will and the end.
tatis potest fieri in finem dupliciter.

·~spondeo

dicendum, quod actus volun-

Vel immediate in ips... f1nem . . . . et

talis actus proprie dicitur voluntas finis ut velle bea.titudinem.

Alio modo

fertur actus in finea mediante eo quod est ad finem, et hoc proprie dicitur

40The temptation is strong to apportion to intention St. Thomas' explicit
dootrine on election, on use, and on oomnand, as stated in the Prima Secunda~.
What he explains about these three, eapecially election, seems to fit intention
also, particularly after one has read .!!!. Veritate, 22, 13-15. Yet, the treatment of intention in I-II, 12, 1-5, is strikingly silent about the notion of
composite act; nor is there any im~ication of it. For st. Thomaa, in the opinion of this author, intentioo remains a simple act of the will, and thus another
differenoe marks it fran the cClllposite act of electioo. For a discussion of
cCllllposi te act in st. Thaua the r~er is referred to the fine article by
George P. Klubertanz t S.J.;"'l'he Unity of Human Activity,· !!!! Modern Sehoo~,
XXVII (January 1950 J , 75-103.
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intendere fin ....41 Again, the act of the wUl in the first case is said to be
of the will absolutely; in the second case the act of the w11l has scaeth1ng in
it which is proper to reason. 42 lor example, the un who desires health or 81J.Y

But if

other thing is said to be wUl1ng absolutely, and his act is volition.

he desire" to attain health through sanetldng els., then his act 1s intentim. 4)
Should, however, the w1ll rest in the aequisitiOl'l of an end, the act of the
will is called fruition.

Consequently fruition does not imply an ordering, as

intention does, but absolute repose in the end.

Further, fruition properly is

had of the last end, whereas intention is of any end. 44
These few stat_ent" IlUffice to prevent confusion between intent:tcn and
either voliticn or fru1ticn.

Since intent1cn not only regards the end, but

necessarily includes 80me consideration ot means, it will be helpful for clarity's sake to explain also the difference between intention and election.
11ection, or chOice, naturally occupies an important place in the study ot
human acta, and consequently there is no dea,rlh of passages in St. Thomas' works
dealing with this operation of the will.

The "aim at present is not to sketch

the essence and properties of the act, but only to compare and oontrll8t it with

4l]n II Sent., )8, 1, 5 sol.;8180, ibid., 3 sol.; ~.!., I-II, 12, 1, ad 4;
8, 2 c;l!! Ver e , 22, 13 c and 15 c (ad fin.).
42~ II ~., 38, expo textus; 38, 1, ), ad 5;

43§.!o, I-II, 12, 1 ad 4;

E! Ver., 22, 14 e

!! Ver.,

22, 13

0

(ad tin.)

(ad fin.).

44s.'1'., I-II, 12, S ad 2: "(1jruit.10 non importat ordinationem alicuius in
aliquid'; siout intentio; sed abaolutam quietea in tine.- .ill.2., 11, 4 ct "Quod
ergo est si.mp11c1ter ult1m.um, in quo aJ.:l.quid delectatur sicut in ultimo fine,
hoc propria dioitur fructusl at. eo propria d1citur aliquis frui • • • • Non aut.
quiascit (voluntatis aotus] simpliciter nisi in ultimo: quia quandiu aliquid
expectatur, motu. voluntatis remanet in suspenso, l10et iam ad &liquid perTenarit." Cf. also 12, If ad 4.

Ithe act of intention.

The principal d1!ference Ues in their respective objects

lintention is of the end, election i. of the aean. to an end. 4,

The pr1ncipal

lsimilarity between the two 11es in their reliance on the ordering of reason,
~hough

in choice that which 1sproper to reason-ccapanng and ordering- makea

~laction

a caaposite &ot. 46 Whereaa in intentica the Ileana are ordered to the

end, in the act

or

ch01ce the meana are

ex:> mpared

one w1th the other, or are

ordered one betore the other. 47 Alter a man has tntended a certain end, it
there is more than just a aingle meana tor the end he w1l.l. next have to we1gh
the means and prefer one to the other.

not alwqa be tollowed by choice.

Thus intent10n precedea choice, and need

In certain instances, though, an aot of the

will could be cons1dered either as ch01ce or aa intent1on, depending on one's

point at view. 48 However, enough haa already been sketched to show that the"
two acts of the will ordered by the intellect are olearl,. distinct and ought
not to be contused.

4,De

~., 22, lS cJ 22, 13, ad 9J In II ~., 38, 1, 3, ad
tutus T"et ideo in III Ethic • • • • 11) J
1-11, 1), 3 c.

!-=!.,

,J

)6, exp.

46ne Ver., 22, 1, c. "Est taman elactio actus voluntatis non absolute, sed

acrrationa, eo quod in electione apparet 1d quod est propriua ratiOnia, acilieet conferre UIllD. alteri, vel praeferre." Cf. alao. !!! II ~., 24,
1, 2 801. and ) sOl.} !.!., I, 63, 3 CJ I-II, 13, 1 o.

in ord1De

47~ Ver., 22, 13, ad 16. «(I]ntentio eat actus voluntatia 1n ordine ad
rationem ordinant8ll ea quae sunt ad finem, in finem ip8UJlJ sed electio eat actus
voluntatis in ordine ad rationem cOllparantem sa quae aunt in finem ad invieem.t
et propter hoc intenUo et elactio d1fferunt."

48!.!e, I-II, 12, 4 ad 3, n[M)otus qUi eat unua aubiecto, potest ratione
differre secundua prineipium et linam, ut aseensio 8t descensio, siout dicitur
in III Phlsic. Me igitur inquantUII motu8 voluntatis fer1iur in id quod est ad
finED, prout ordinatur ad finem, est electio. J(otU& aut_ voluntati& qui fertur in tinem, secundum. quod aequin tur per ea quae aunt ad t1nem., vacatur intentio. Cuius aignUII est quod intentio finis t"sse poteat, et1_ nondwn dete1"l1inatis his quae sunt ad fin., quorum eat electio."
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To 8\DDIIlB.rize aDd at the same time corroborate the exposition given it will
be profitable to consider other texts bearing on the topiC, text. drawn fran
locations other than the principal three.
Firat the notion of intention was found to signify in general aome tendency
or inolination.

Indioating this general meaning are auch passages aau "Ion au-

t_ intentio et appetitua materiae est ad privation.. sed ad fO%'llU.,,49 and
fI

(O)_e &gens habet aliqua intention_ et desideriUII finis,·SO in which the

conjoined w:orda !pp!tite and desire seem aerely to repeat the _.e idea (auch as
one might praiae "the peace and quiet of the countrT').
:Nut it was seen that tntentim is an act of the will, which is proved frcaa
the fact that its object is the end.

"Intentio aut. eat aotua voluntatis, ut

supra habit. est. quia intentio .st de fine, qui est voluntatis obiectUDl."Sl
-'.oes8e est igitur dicere, quod in productione oreaturarum a Deo ait aliquis
finis intentua.
aliter et aliter.

Jitvenitur autem agere propter tin. et volunta. et natura, sed
Natura enia • • • non pot"st .ibi prustituer. fin_, nee se

in .tina movere aut ordinare vel dirigere; quod quid_ competit agenti per

voluntata, cuius est intelligere et tinem et omnia praedicta.

lhde agens per

voluntat. sic agit propter tin_, quod prae8titu1t aibi finem, et leipa'" quodammodo in fin_ movet,

IUS

actione. in ips. ordinando. ,,52

But the will does not produce an act of intention completely by itself, and

49 c•o., III, 4

-So
l!!

(in med.).

I!!!!!,., ).."r:! 1, 1 sol.

Sl!e.r.,

II-II, 180, 1 c.

--

S2Ile Pot., ), lS c.
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it requirea the assisting functions ot the intellect, both to have an object to
rwill, and to will an object that ia ordered.

Further, it was said that the in-

teraction of will and reaeon at•• from their roots in a common supposit.

Re-

garding theee three pOints, st. Thoma. says: tiDe agentibus auteRI per intellectua
non eat dubiUlll quin agant propter fin_: agunt enim pre.econcip1entes in intelleotu id quod per actionem consequuntur, et ex tali praeconceptione agunt; boc
enUl .st agere per intellect.· ,53

-Manitestu est aut_ quod l'atio quodammodo

volvntatem. praeoedit, et ordinat actum e1u•• inquantum scil1cet vol\Bltaa in au_
obiect_ tendit eecundUll ordinem l'at1on1., eo quod via apprehendva appet1t1vae
suum. obiectUIII repraesentat tf ,54 and a[QJuia actua voluntat1s at rat ionia supra 8e
inv1cem. possunt terri, pl"OUt ecilicet ratio ratioc1natur de volendo, et volunt...
vult rat10cinariJ contingit aetum vollll'ltat1. praeven1r1 ab actu ration1., et e
COllVel"SO.

It quia virtu. prioria actua reaanet in actu aeqUClt1, contingit

quandoque quod est aliquia actus voluntatia. secundum quod manet virtute in ipso
aliquid de actu ration!a, ut dictum eat de UIJU .t de elect1one, et e cmverao
aliquia eet actus rationia, secunda quod virtute .net in ipso a1iquid de actu
vol untatis ••55
,inally, through ccmpar1am and contrast at. Thoma. clarH'iea the differ-

ences between intention and the other acts of the 1i:1ll, both those who.e object
is the end and one in partiCular whose object i8 the Ileana.

53£_.2_,
54!.!.,

III, 2 (Adhuc. Ome agens).

1.11, 13, 1 c.

55Ibid ., 17, 1

c.

Fol' the prior cea-
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parison the following passage, treating of the passions of the cc:ncupisoible
appetite, will be useful because it illustrates the direct parallel in a lower
appetite of the acts of the higher appetite.

·PriJIla ergo 1mm.utatio appetitus ab

appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est allud quam complacentia appetibilis; et

ex: hac caaplacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desideriun, et ultimo
quies, quae est gaudium ... 56 The follOWing passage indicates the basic ditferenc~
between 1Dtending and choosing.

"Respondeo dicendum, quod volmtas dupllc1ter

potest cma1derari$ vel secund\D. quod eat intendens, prout in ultimum fin_ fertur, Tel secundum quod est eligens, prout tertur in objectllBt proximum, quod in
fiuem ult1m'UII ordinatur. ftS7

The preceding review of texts has summarized brietly the main el_ants
necessary for a proper understanding of what it is to intend.

Hence one might

say that all of the essential notes, all that one needs in order to formulate

a clear definition of intention, have been proposed 'thus tar.
act ot the will i., in its physical

reality,~

However, since an

a very definite activity, it, like

other act. of the hUlll8l'l soul, is capable of twO types of circumstantial JIloditication.

The first type springs trOJll the operation of the intellect, the second

derive. trail the motion of the will.
tion; both can

80

Both together modif;y wery act of inten-

ruse with the act of intention and with each other as to def;y

separate identification within that act; both often pa88 under the name inten~.

Furthermore, and most important, the element of attention must neceasaril,.

enter the picture of intentioo at this pOint.

56Ibid., 26, 2 c.

-

57l!. n !!!!!.,

40, 1, 2 801.

For up t111 now the entire aim of

20

this chapter has not been achieved.

A full explanation of an actual 1ntenticm

has not yet been seen, for the attention which is a property of the conscious
activity of the intellect and which consequently accompanies the ordering of
means to end is lfOrthy of salle diacussioo..

i'or all these reasons, then, it will

be neceS8a17 to continue the explanation of the act of intention witha conside:ratiCil of attention and intensit1' ..
Attention, for present purposes, allows of five stat_ents.

First of all,

attentiw in man 1s an activity ot .. property of, and consequence of the operation of the cognoscit1ve powers, eapecial.ly the intellect. When a man is paying
attenUw,

&8

we say, to saae object, he 1s not willing it nor desiring it.

He

is knOlling it, and mowing it in act.

That is, his cognitive faculties are

operating on that object conscio\181r.

Because man's intellect is limited in its

operation to a single object, a man can attend on11' to one thing or Ullr things
related into a unity.58 As proof of thiS, the intellect must turn its attenticn
from sensible activity to busy itself' with more intellectual pursuits. as, for a
ca&1lDn example, in the case of musicians, whoa. attention is directed to the music and not to their fingera.S'9

Also, since it is the intellect that attends,

a man' 8 efforts to learn, to m81loriz., to contemplate, to reason, and

80

on, can

be hindered by anything distracting or otherwise impeding the use or the 1ntel';"

180",.60
Secondly, the intellect and the other eognoscitive powers are ordinarily

58B!!.!!., 13, 3

c.

59~ .. , obj. 10 J

60 S.T

--

t ,

.!!!

IV ~ .. ,

15, 4, 2, 5, obj. 2.

I-II, 37, 1 c and ad 3J 77, 1 c; JJ, J, ad 3.
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to attend b7 the will, but an object. can in carta1n c1rcuaetance. at'beet

~O¥'.d

the cOgDoec1t.1.... poIIers

t.

!will
or the

role

eo

st1"Ongl1 t.hat the w1ll' a cmtrol 1. neutralized.

1. illuatrated. by

The

the tut that a un can have an hab1 tual knowledge

seience at geaaet", and yet not attend to thia knowledge at all. 6l On

the other hand, a man actuall7 can be
hi. will C8lU'lot divert the attent1cz

.0

at

engroaaed 111 a paniona'e aetiY1ty that
the intellect

rraa

it. object. 62 'lb.

rollowmg text d_matrat •• Icme at the correlat1.,.e .t1Inot1ou ot intellect and

iwUl

in thia act of attent1on. -Via cognoacltiva non copoacit al:I.quid actu n1al

adal t intctio I unde et phantaaata in organa conaervata interdQa non actu 1m&-

g1n_ur, quia 1I1tent10 nm tertur ad ea. awetitua eniJI al1ae potentia. in act_
!movet in agent1bus per vol-untat.. -ulta igltuI" ad quae aiJaul intentio non rertur, nm

.unu

intU8II1lr.

Quae aut. oportet aub una intentione cadere, oportet

saul .... intellecta. qu1 .,iJI cOllparat1an. cluorwa can.iderat, intent10na
ad 'd1'WqUe dingit at eiJlul intuet1ll' utruJDque. "6)

Thirdly, jUlt aa, properly epeald.q, it:. ..a8 t.h. whole soul that inclin..

'.
toward, or intends, .0 too it is the whole .oul. tbat 8OIlehow becoue in...ol....d in
attending .md intending at onea.

st. '.lbaaa. scut:l.!le. does not

So .uch

BO,

tbat in describing the phenounon

try to Jl&ke the two act. olearly

di.t1nct., and

61Ib~d.. 77, 2 c t "Quod aut_ homo DC. cons1deret in particular! 1d quod
hab1tual.1ter so1t, quandoque quidea cont1ngit ex solo der"tu intentimia. put.a
ClB homo ac1en. geaaetriall, nen intendit ad oonaiderandlM geClletr1ae CQl011181o~•• , quae .tatim in prampt.u bab.t conaiderare. tf Alao, B!. !!la, ), 10 c.
62S•T., l-n, 77, 1 C I "Unde Y1dtaU8 quod hOllline. in al1q11& paI.1me ex1etente.,
tacile 1Mginat1onem avertunt &b his circa que att1cluntur. Unde
per conaequene iudicita rat1cnie pleraque .eqi.l1tur pass1m_ appet1tus 88I111t1lVi) et per oonaequens motus voluntaU., qui natua .st .equi 1udiciUlll ration1••
cr. alao 33, ) ad 2 and E.! H!'+o, 3, 10 c.
6)

-nen

e.G., I. S5.
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employ. ~ttender~ and intender~ interchangeably.

"(A)d actum cuiusclRque ooa-

noscitivae potentiae requir1tur intentio, ut probat Augustinus in lib.

2!

'l'r1nit

Intentio autem unius nan poteet terri ad multa smul, nisi torte illa multa hoo
modo aint ad invioem ardinata, ut acoipiantur quaai unum; siout nec aliouius

110-

tus vel operationil pos.unt eale duo tennini non ad invicem ordinati.

cUm

Unde,

sit una an:1ll&, in qua <Dna. cognoacitivae potentiae f'undantur unius et eiusdem
intentia requirltur ad <1IDium. potentiarum cognoacitlvarum actua: et ideo, cum
totallter anima 1ntendat ad actua lmiue potentiae, abatrahitur hOllo ab actu &1teriuf) potentiae ••64 In airtilar 'Vein and to the lame effect I

..

[Q1u1a ames

potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicantur, necease est quod, quando
intentio aniIlae vehementer tra.hitur ad operation_ unius potentiae, retrahatur
ab ope ratione alteriusl unius enint animae non potest esse nisi una 1ntentio.

It propter hoc, Ii aliquid ad ae trahat totam intentiona an1mae, vel magn8.lll
partem ipsius, non oompatl tur secum aliquid aliucl quod aagnam attenticmeIB
requirat. tt6S Again, it surely il !! who

att~d: nEe. qutbua veheDlent1u.a inten-

dimus, magi. in memoria manent. a66
Fourth~,

despite the prOKiaity ot the two, attention il not the. saRe aa

intention, the act of the Will.

The reason ia that the intellect can retlect

upon, and consequent:q attend to, every act or the will, including intention or

64~

!!r., 13, .3 o.
6S!.!.., I-II, 37, 1

c. Also, ~., n-II, 17S, S ad 3. «(V11res animae
vegetabills non operantur ex intentione animae, sicut v1re. sensitivae, sed per
modum naturae. Et ideo non requiritur ad raptlD abstractio ab eis, aiout a
potentiis senait1vi., per quarum operationes minueretur intentio animae oir.ca
intellectivUl cogniticuem.1'I

66.!! ~

!!!!., S

(ad .f':1n. lae par.).
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the end.

For if' the "voluntas vult int.ellectum intelligere," it is equally t.rue

that the ttintellectus intelligit. Tolunt.atem. ,,67 Further proof of this Ues in
the fact. t.hat. the object. of int.ent.ion is that good (the end) to which certain
means are ordered, wher... the object of attenticm can be any good or

111 y

truth.

In the fifth plaoe, it all that. haa been said in t.he tirst four points is

true, it follows that., when the attention. of the intellect. focuses on the object
of the will which i. an cd to which are ordered m.ean8, and the will desires

that object, then the intenUm ot the end is what is called an actual. intentim
The power does not act without it, object.

But the object of the will requisite

for an act of intention JlU8t. be intentionally represented and proposed by the
intellect, which cannot. occur unless the intellect is attending to the object.
ConSequently actual intention of an end requires and is distinguished :trail other

types of intentian by the attention of the intellect paid to the end and to the
_ans as for that end.

Attending to this cClD.p08iteobject, the agent will. the

end-this i. actual intention.
Just as attention, so intensim is a Dlod!tying characteristic of intention.
Intension, or the increaeing of velOCity to

~

peak, i. opposed to r&1lission, or

the deereaaing of velOCity once the peak ha. been reached, or at least once SaBe
higher point haa been reached. 68

Strictly, it would be correct to say that an

operation which began from reat and is just on ita way to gaining sOlIe momenta
has some intensity.

But u,age seems to prefer that intClsity aignify an :1ncU-

nation or movement with a certain vehemence.

Hence to operate with a small

-,_._--67

1; De Ver., 22, 12 c.

~.!.,

68~ !!!

I, 16,

4 ad

lJ cf. also 82,

Cado, II, 8 and 9 J

E! ~

4 ad

--

q. un., 1, ad 16.
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outlay' of effort would be to act remissly or halt-heartedly or moderately, but
to act with intensity is to act with "Vigor, with Tehemence. 69

So the human

agent can exercise in his activity a range of degrees ot intensity, depending em
the energy- with whioh the soul inolines toward

SOlIe

objeot or some one of its

own act •• 70 The following sumo iates aptly St. ThOmas' "View ot intension and
the soul's powers. ·Praeterea, quando una Tirtu. IlUltum. intenditur in sua operatione, alia potentia abstrahi tur a suo actu I siout illi qui "Veh_enter intendtmt
ad aliquid audiendua, nm percipiunt "Vi. ea quaei coram ipsi. ti1m'- J "(Qluando
mens intenditur in euo actu circa absentia, quae_unt a sensibus raota, tunc
propter "Vehementi_ intentioni. sequitur alienatioa sensibus. w71
The dynamio source of this greater or less d~gree ot energy exerted is, ot
I

i

course, the whole supposit united by a single sota, l;>ut again, sinoe the soul's
I

'

I

,',

rational inclination i. called a will and its other iitolinationa are given the
names ot other appetitive powers, the energy is ottemattributed to the motion

ot the will and the other appetites. Thus it is ."'erred that the sensitiTe apo"

petite moves with intensity to the oonsequent "~etrilllent of the will's motion, 12
rI

"am

69!_!e, I-II, 35, 6 0 I
omnis Matus ~a~ralis intendor est in fine ••
• • Unde et inclinatio appetitivae virtutis, pe~ se loquendo, vehementius tendit
in delectation. <tU8lll tugiat tristitiam.- ~., 37, I 0: -quando intmtio
anima. vehementer trahitur ad operationem. unius potentiae • • • tI
10.E!.!!!:., 13, 3

OJ

.!! lIal2.

3, 9

CJ

!.!.,

I-II, 17, I

0

and 2 o.

71~.!., II-IL, 173, 3, obj. 2 and ad 2.
72!e!., I-II, 17, I 0: hEt secundUDl hmc modUDl, per quando distraction.,
quando aotus appetitu8 sensitivi tortitioatur secundua quamcumque passiona,
nece.se est quod rem1ttatur, vel totaliter impediatur motus proprius appetitu8
rationali8, qui eat voluntas. N

!aDd that the will can desire inten8ely a 8inful act7J or a good &ot.74
Since the will is capable of de8iring intensely any act, it can intend intensely also.

-tllntenaio actus interioris vel exterioris potest referri ad in-

tention_ ut objectuml puta cum aliqui. intendit inten8e velle, vel &liquid intanse operarl. u75

Thus inten8ity modifies intention as it doe8 other will act8.

One final. point deserves notice: the mutual infiuence of attention and
~tensit;y.

Attention stimulates inten8it;YJ intensity, on the other hmd, foster

~ttention.

'1'hat St. Thomas reoogni&ed thi8 fact seems apparent frClll the various

tpas8age8 cited already in discussing attention and intension.
~dditional

text will bring out the interaction. lIJ(anife8tum est

However, one

ana

quod quan-

documque una potentia intenditur in suo actu, alia potentia vel impeditur vel
totaliter avertitur a suo actuJ 8icut cum &liqu18 intentus est ad aliquem audiendum, non percipit hom1nea pertranaeuntem. it hoc ideo conting1t, quia omnes
potent.iae radicantur in una an1m&, cuius intentio appl1cat unamquaaque potentia
ad

SUUlll

actUIIU et ita

CUll.

aliqu18 fueri t fOIiiter intentu8 circa actum uniu8
"

potentiae, minuitur eius intentio circa acta :alteriu8.

Sic ergo

ClB

fuerit

concupiscentia forti8, aut ira, aut aliquid hu:1.uSlllodi, impeditur a consideratione 8cientiae. n76
With the elemente that belong to the act of intention (hence e.pee1all;y to
an act of actual intention) known, the next two chapter8 inveetigate the nature
of habitual and virtual intention.

7J 1bid., 6

C <ad fin.) and ad

74Ibid., 24, J, ad 1.
75~.!.,

76£!

I-1I, 19, 8 c.

!&lo,

J, 9

c.

3.

CHAPrER II

HABITUAL INTENTION
The subject or this chapter will be the hahi tual intention.

Though an

anaeration of the three types of intention has acquired the more or less cuatomary sequenoe of actual, virtual, and habitual, the order here to be followed
inverts the last two.

For this study' 8 chiet O)ncern is directed to virtual

intention, with the other two subordinated to it as much as possible.

Fitting-

ly, therefore, the explanation of the lBabitual intention should precede discussion of the virtual.

Also, this choice ot arrangement places immediately after

the stud7 of actual intention what is more sharply centrastable with it.

The-

c CIltrast will not only aid in understand!.'lg the two . types, but will in tum
prepare for an easier understanding of the

~ture

of vi,rtual intent\. on.

Knowing what an habitual intention is haa its diffioulties.

First of all,

the differences between it and actual intention seem to overwhelm any res __
blances between the two.

For, whereas the actual is defined as an elicited act

ot the will regarding an end, in which reason enters by ordering and also by
attending to the end in the act itself, the habitual even b;y its name professes
not to be an act, and rules out as a consequence the possibility at aocompany;ing attentiveness.

The difference str:1k:es a person as SO considerable, in tact,

that one can justifiably raise into question the propriety of calling the habitual intention an intention at all.

In what sense, then, does "habitual inten-

26

27
signify an in1ientiont
many 1iimes'

In the sense that 1ihe ac1i of intention has been repeated

Such an interpretation of the sense of the words is possible, but

this is not what st. Thomas means by an habitual intention, or rather, by intending habitual.ly (for he seems never to have used the ph!"ase habituaf intentioo
as it was used by later philosophe!"s and theologians).l

Perhaps, then, the

phrase means that an intending ot an end exists in the will neither in actuality
no!" in f:vtentiality only, but in saae intemed1ate staget This could indeed be
the case, tor quite unmistakably St. Thomu often so describes a habi1i. 2
Howeve!", one ough1i not answer too hutiq.
~his

It can turther be asked whether

:tarabitual intention, if it truly is a habit, is really a habit or disposi-

tion ot the 11'111, or

Illq

i1i no1i rather be a habi1i of 1ihe in1iellect'l lor it

..ould ae. that it cannot belong to the will.

'irst of all, at. Thomas states

explicitly 1ihat the will' a nature il completely adequate tor its proper operatim, and consequently needs no babita, i.e., needs ,no qualities which dispose
it tor operation)

-(D]upl1c1 ratione aliq",-, potentia hab1tu indiget. Pr:t;uo
"

quid_, quia operatio quae est per potentiam eduoenda, excedi t Vim potentiae,
quaavia non excedat vim totius naturae h1DAD.&e. Alio modo quia totiua naturae
vim $Xcedit • • • • Primo autem modo ind1get habitu intellectuaJ eo quod intelligere aliquid non potest nili a.similetur e1 per speciem intelligibilem. • • • •

• • • • • •

tion.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Artectiva au-

lIn §.!., III, ~, 8 ad J St. Thomas uses the phrase to mean virtual intenThis unusual usage will be explained in the next chapter.

2!.!., I, 79, 6 ad

--

J; 87, 2 c; I-II, SO, 4 ad 2; 71, ) cJ et ale

lS.T., I-II, 49, 1 c.
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tea superior ncm indiget hoc modo aliquo habitu, quis naturaliter tendit in bonUl'll sibi connaturale sieut in proprila obiectua.

Unde ad hoc quod velit borrwIl,

non requiritur ni.i quod ostendatur sibi per via eognitivam ... 4 Again,

n

(pJ er

habitum virtuti. potentia quae ei sub11citur, respeotu sui actus complem.entum
aequirit.

Und. ad id ad quod potentia aliqua •• extendit ex ipsa ration. paten-

ti&8, non eat necessariua habitu8 v1rtutis.

Virtus aut_ ord1nat potentias ad

bonum; ipsa enill est quae bonum tacit habentel, at opus eius bonUII reddit.
Voluntas aut_ hoc quod virtus tacit circa alias potentias, habet ex ipsa ratione

SU&e

potentiae. nam eius obiectum eat bonum.

Uncle tendere in bonum. hoc modo

se habet ad voluntatem sicut tendere in delectabUe ad concupiscibil_, et 81cut
ordinari ad sona se habet ad auditUil.

Unde voluntu nCll indtget aUquo habitu

virtutis inclinante ips_ ad bonua quod est sibi proportionatlD. ItS
The.e words deSCribe, however, the will t S opere.tion with regard to its
formal objeot, the good in general.

Hence at. Thc:aa. shoq just as well that

the will neverthele.s requ1rea habits tor op,rat1ng promptly, easily, firmly,
and with pleasure in regard to this or t.bat partioular good. 6

still, "the diffi-

oulty remains, because the habits that St. Thoaas is .peaking ot are virtues,

4B!, .!!!:., 24, 4, ad 9.

Ct. also

.§..!.,

I-II, 62, l ad 1 and c.

SDe Vinoo in COIIIIl., So. The objeotions JUke certain that. there is no
mistakiiig-si: ThOiu.-;tmindJ e.g., the first: ft[A)d imperandum sutticit voluntati
iudieium rationis; nail voluntas appetit naturaliter quod est bonum secundum
rationem, sicut coneup1scibilis quod eat delectabile secundum sensum."

6Soo T., I-li, 50, 5 ad 1: "Sed quia necessarium est ad tinem. humanae Vitae,
quod vrs-appetitiva !nclinetur in &liquid determ1natum, ad quod non inclinatur
ex natura potentiae, quae se habet ad multa et diversa; ideo necesse .st quod
in voluntate, et in al11s viribua appetitivis, sint quaedam quaUtates inclinantes, quae dicuntur habitus." Also: 49, 4J 56, l 0; II-II, 58, 12 o.

29
Inamely, the virtues of charity and justice'? But an intention of the end is not
a virtue, as is evident from the fact that a man ..ith many virtues can have a
bad intention, and on the other hand a man with vioious habits can at the same

time act with a good intention.

"Et ideo sieut potest contingere quod aliquis

habens habitum vitiosUJI, prorumpat in actum virtutis, eo quod ratio non totaliter corrumpitur per malum habitun, sed aliquid eiu. integrum. manet, ex quo provenit quod paccator ali qua operatur de genere bonorum ...8

-(p] ecoatum oomparatur

ad virtuten stcut actus malul ad habitum. bonum. Aliter autem
in anilla, et forma in re naturali.

SU8.1ll

habet habitus

Foma enim natura1is ex necessitate producit

operationem sibi convenient_ • .. ••
producit

B8

Sed habitus in anima nm ex neees.!tate

operation., sed hOlllo utitur eo cta voluerit.

Unde s1mul habitu

in homine existente, pote.t non uti habltu, aut agere contrarium actum.

Et

sic potest habens virtutem procedere ad aetua peccati. n9
Not only does it seen that the habitual intention cannot be a habit of the
will, but, judging fran the ..~rd. of the Ang,lic Doctor himself, a habitual in-

tention .eem. to. be a habit of the intelleat, ·8imilar to the habitual knowledge
of f!rst principle. or of a science, and existing thu. a8 nothing else but a
species in the intellectual m_o17.
in the memory constitute .ome kind

In the first place intelligible speoies

ot habit: tt[S]pecies intelligib1118 aliquando

e.t in intellectu in potent1.a tantuml et tunc dicitur intelleotns e.se in poten-

7l)e Vin. in COI'IIl., , c: ·Sie ergo duae virtutes sunt in vo1untate sieut
in subIecto,; seTIi'aetcarita •. et iustitia." Cf. a.1so ~.!., I-II, 56, 6 c.

8~.!., I-II, 78, 2 oJ o~ler pertinent passages: 3 a and ad 2, ad 3; 4 c.
9~., 71, 4 o.
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tia.

Aliquando autem aeeund'Ulll ultimam oompletionem aotwu et tunc 1ntelligit

actu.

Aliquando . .dio modo se habet inter potenti_ et aotulU et tunc dicitur

a"e intellectue in habitue

Et aecund\1ll hunc modum intellectus conaervat spe-

ciea, etiam quando actu nan intelligit. ulO This habit'issODle kind ot actual1t7
but not a perfect kind: "Nee tamen aequitur quod semper intelligatur aeoundum
ill_ speci_, sed solUll quando intellectus possibilia pertecte fit in actu
reepectu illiu8 speciei.

Quandoque Tero est iaperfecte in actu

Imedio inter pure.m potentl&m et pllrlal acta.

nus

quod8laodo

It hoc est habitual iter cognoscerel

et de hoc m.odo, cognition!s reduoitur in actUJlt perteetum per yoluntatea."ll
Then, from the follOWing text, it appears that an habitual intention would be
n1lnbered amOng the species in the intellectual. lIlemo1"7, considering that an act
of the will can be retained in the

!!:!:!!.,
~ua,

1181101'71 .. {S]lcut

Auguetinus probat XIV

2!.

inteillgere dic1m.ur et "telle seu amare al1qua, et quando de his ex> g1:ta-

et quando de hia nm COgit8llUS.

Sed quando .ine cogitatione 8\1Rt, ad solam

.Mor1am pertinentJ quae nihil est aliud, sec.undum ipaum, qua habitual1s retentio notitiae at amori •• - 12
Further evidence of st. ThOlll&8' lIind cOIle. from a comparison of texts.
wHab1tualiter enlm refert in Deum et qui nihil aglt, nec aliquid act_liter
1ntendit, ut dormiens, .13, and

·(1]0

quod habitualiter ineat, quandoque aliquie

ut1 nOl'l poteat propter al1quod imped1m.entwlU aieut homo non potest uti habitu

10!.!., I, 79, 6 ad 3.
II

De Ver.,

la,

2, ad

4.

12-§..!., I, 93, 7 ad 3.

13,!!. Car1t., 11, ad 3.

1•
Ct. alao I, 8q.
7 ad 1.
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sCientiae propter 8omnum.

~t

similiter puer non potest uti habitu intellectus

principiorum, vel etiam lege naturali, quae ei habitualiter inest, propter
de!ectlll aetatis. a14 Considering the tWo, and knowing how, inevitably, St. Tho~s

will give as instances ot habitual intention the disposition ot a

II&n

who

is asleep, or insane, or in Tenial sin, the conclUsiCll'l followa 84sily that the
habi tual intention resides in the memory of a man who is asleep, etc., in the
same way that the man's habitual knowledge is retained in his _.ory, or, to be
more preCise, in his possible intellect.
ivery-day experience rallles to the support of this c oncluai on, for does
Inot a man who wakes frca 81eep have to tum back to his memory to reiUmber what
Ibe had intended to do first thing on riling?

Men, allo, who regain conlciou...

lnes8 after haYing suffered an utlexpected loss of it, for a time are at a 1088
to do anything, WltU they have "gotten their bearings" a. thel

say}

that is,

Wltil they haTe recalled either what they were doing previously. or hUe situated
themselves in their present circum8tance8.' l!nlike the man who has deliberately
•
8urrendered him8ell to _luaber, theae have not'had the opportunity to toresee
their e1tuatiQl upon retum of consciousness, and thus they could not have 'preintended' the actions they would perfOl'll in that situation.

Hence, a peraon in

this predicament i_ temporarily mabIe to act for any deliberate end, until he
remembers what his
mant. lS

]a.

st intention was and discOT8rs the identity of hi_enYirm-

The point to be stre.sed here is that the habitual intention seems,

from both the words of st. Thomas and the testimony of experience, to consist in

14!.!., I-n, 94, 1, ad 1

in contr.

15The person might very well execute instinctive acts, certainly, such as
rubbing his head or eyes, or casting about for scme clues to his location, etc.
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10thing elae but a vestige in the possible intellect.
However attractive these arguments may be, the truth ia that St. Tbc.aa
fmderstands the habitual intention as S<IIlehow a disposition of the will.
~counters

~otest

One

no amibigui ty in auch texta as I -In amentibua autem et dormientibus

esse voluntas cmtraria habitual1s, quamv1s non sit actual1a.

Et ideo

s1 ante aOllrlum vel furiam f'uerunt ccntrariae voluntati8, non recipiunt sacramen-

tUDl, quia adhuc illa vollmtas habitual iter manet, .16 and -@JiCut modu8 praesentis vitae non patitur ut homo semper actu feratur in Deum, ita etia non patitur
quod actu feratur in ClImes prox1m.os 8:ingillatimt sed aufticit quod feratur commun1ter in ames in universali, et in singulos habitualiter et 8ecundum animi
praeparation_.,,17 The "terri- of which st.

'l'h01US

apeaks in this st9Cmd pas-

sage refers to the activity ot loving, the object ot which is either God or the
ineighbor. since both the objection and the reply given here accept the phrase
~ ~

habit!!!lll as 8aid of God, and since loving .God must nece8sarily be done

at least somet:1m.es o.n.ly by lanng intentions, this second quotation iapllcitly
state. what the fi1"llt expresses in clear terms.
Neverthele8S, what has been said about the species in the possible intel...
lect is not to be rejected as amisinterpretation or a mistake.
in me aspect of the picture.

For, let it be recalled, an actual intention is

of an end, and consciously of an end.
senting to the will an object,

Bather, it fills

~

That means that the i.ntellect was pre-

being directed by the will to attending to

the object, and was therefore by reflex1m seeing itself aa doing these things

- !.!.,

16m IV Sent., 6, 1, 3, 3
17

ad

II-II, 184, 2 ad 3.

2.
Ct. also

44, 4 ad

2.
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and seeing the will as willmg that object.

N",.. all that tohe intellect has

apprehended can be retained by it, in the memory or po.sible intellect, in the

tom ot intelligible species.

'!'hi, it is that enables a man to reflect back

upon hia m_orr to recall his intentim.

For what he can aee there ia not ml:y'

the object ot his intentioo (i.e., the 8l'1d), but also the tact that he had made
an intention.

Therefore the intention does reside in the intellect a. a habit

of the intellect, a. a particular speciea in the possible intellect represent-

ing the will'. act of :mtmding a certain end.

But i t this were all that is

necessary to constitute an habitual intenUon, then the term very clearly is
Dd.sleading,18 and St. Thaaas has erred often in his oonception ot habitual
intention, to take the above-quoted texts as only two examples.
On the other hand, it at.ThaDas understands the habitual intention as a
quality ot the will, howcan he meet the objection baaed on his

0Im

words;

namely, that the CIll7 habits of the will are charity, in the supernatural
order, and justice, in the natural order?
At thi. point the author of this thea is wishe, to propose his own ,olution
to a problem which he thinks st. Thcaas nowhere fomulates expliCitly.

And he

wiehes to solve the problem in, the only manner he thinks possible: by advancing the explanation as he seea it frca clues tound in st:,rhcmas' words on
habit, and the moral virtues, and thm by pre..nting afterwards the passages
where St. fhaaas speaks ot habitual intention in 0z:ci~\'~o, ~rifythe, solutiCll
advanced.

/

!
\

'''.,

l&rbe term habit i. being _played in the appll~Ct~.-~rlbed in S.T.,
I-II,
1 CJ "00 liquid pote.t diei es.e habitus dupliciter. Uno modo'; proprie .t esaentialiterl et sic lex naturalis non est habitus • • • • Alio modo
•• '. id od habitu teneturf sicut dieitur tides id quod tide tenetur."

9u,
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Accordingly, he proposes first of all that the habitual intention is not
to be cCIlceived aa a separate habit in the soul, but aa the resultant of, or the
product of, a ntaber of habits in the soul-not an actual product, of course,
because 1t ia 8OIl8tb1ng habitual that 1. being BOught, but one which exist.
rlrtuall.7 in tho.. habi ta • A aingl. hui t will not explain babi tual intention.
Natural charity, or natural. d1leation as st. ThCIIIIU calla it, cannot explain)
for the will n_da no hahi t to operate in reprd to objects which it can will
natural.ly.19

Giyen that t.he intellect baa pro_ted the will with eri.d.eDce

that God is ita ohief good, the rill responde 1Duaed1ately.
charity is not • habit ot the will.

Consequently natural

lor oan j\l8ti08, the only habit aee1ped

by st. Thou. to the rill its.lt, explain ccapletely the habitual intentica:.
For the virtue of justice a:t.da a un to act in

0J2l7 eme field

of

exerei.. of correct relationships with the neighbor. 20 Thua i t

etten.

118

the

were look:1ng

for an hahi tual jut 1ntentiOCl, we would .find. it in .the will' a habit of juatice.
But the quest is for an bahitul intention of any good, not merely that good

which pertaina to the neighbor.

Hence j118tiC8' iB not the IOUl"Oe of hAbitual

intention.
On. stroopr grOlUlda neither can the 'Virtues of fortitude and temperance,

19Ct _ !_!., I, 60, 2 c, 3 c, 4 CJ I-II, 49 4 C and ad 3, 56, 6 c.
20In S.T., II-II, 58, 12 C st.'1'hQllU 1s alunrering tbat justice 1s more
excellent thin the other moral virtuea) legal juaUce clearly is so,and particular juat1*.'j(jj:80 tor two reasons: "Quana prima poteat 8UJI:1_parte subieoti t
quia sc1licet eat in nob1l1ori parte an1mae, ideat in appet1tu rationali, scilicet voluntate; &111. v1rtutibuB moral1.bua exiBtentibus in appetitu aen8itivo,ad
qua pertinent passion.a, quae aunt _teri. aliarum vlrtutum morall_. Secunda
ratio 8lIIIlitur ex parte obieoti. lla aliae virtute. laudantur sol. secundum
bonUlll ip.ius virtuosi. Iuatitia auta laudatur secundum quod vinuo.us ad ali_
bene .. babein et IJic 1uatitia quodaaloclo eat bonum alterius.- ct. alSOI Ibid.,
2 e and 3 C J I-n, 56, 6 0 I 100, 2 ad 2: De V1rt. ........
in -COIII8.,
5 o.
-.-,

---

~
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the habits found in the iraec1ble and concupiscible powers respectively, satia!7
our search.

The.. v1rtues are reall7 only a -ll-eltabllshed confol'llity of the

two "naitive appetites t~ the dictat •• of reason. 2l
!boUgh the pos.ibilities tor finding a hab1t tor the will have seemingly
Ibeen exhaueted, two raa1n.

The first is that ot pruden.e. the v.Lrtue ot the

IPractical. intellect whose object is the proper_on leading to an end.
second poasibillt7 il that of a cOIIb1nation of the moral. Virtuel.

The

the author ot

fthis th.sis think. that the answer will b. found in the latter chOice, with pruIdence nece.sarily numbered

UlQllg

th_.

He propose. that, when St. Thaaa. l1888 the term habitual intention, he baa
~

!dnd that atate of the .oul in which the practioal intellect is intoraed nth

prudenoe (or with the
~re

COl'reapQllding

nae of imprudence), the .en.itive appetite.

po......d ot the aoral. virtue. of tortitude and temperance (or the cont1"&17

!riae.), and the will i. po......d of the aoral virt. of jUst1o.22 (or injustice)J
~o

that, wi1;h the soul eo disposed, the will .has been also di.posed in a "r.Y

~in1te manner to intend an end in accordance··with right rea.on (or against
~ght reason).

The rtrtue ot justioe is included in this state ot the .oul be-

.ause its preeence in the w1ll is nee.ssary, even though it Il&y not b. exercised
in ""17 h'tlUll action.

ane's habitual intention can be the reault of one'. last

n as.,

I-II, 56, 4 c J IIIn hi. igitur circa quae operatur iraacibilis et
pcmcuplac;lbil1s secllllldua quod ._10 a rat10ne motae, nee.... e.t ut al1qu1. habitus pertiei" ad b.ne apndua .1t non .01_ in ratione, ••d atiam in ira.scibil1
~t conoup1ecibll1. It quia bona dispo8ltio potenti.. moventi. motu, attenditur
Iaecund\8 confo:naitat_ ad potenti.. movent_; ideo virtua quae est in irascib1l1
~t concup1ec1bill" nihU aliud est qua quaedaR habitual1. contormit&l i.taraa
J>otent1a.rum ad ration_." Of. also.!!
~ £!:!e.., b c.

nne

22Justice in the proper sen•• , not the metaphOrical, as noted abewe (p.34,
what i. Mant throughout thi8 section.

~. 20) is

)6
delibera"te act with regard to one t • selt, in which caso prudence and taperance
and forti tude are involved (and the.e three are al....,.s involved), but not juetice.

Nevertheless, at the time or that act the rill had to have the virtue ot

justice, for if prudence and the other moral virtues are present, justice must
be also present,23 and, vice veraa, 11' injustice prevail. inatead of justice,
then the man i. not trul;y ordered to hi. proper end, and eo doe. not haye the
other moral virtue•• 24
Prudence and the moral virtues are interl1nked in dependence.
uire. the other..

'lbe me ra-

Thus, when a choice of action i. offered to a man, the proc-

• that take. place before he choo... i • •aa.."hat the following'

the practical

tellect examines the object (be it a thing or an extemal or intemal action),
ees its relation to the end, and propose. the object in its rela't1en to the end
o the willJ25 the rill then ia free to desire thia object tor that end, or not
o de.ire it; me&nWhUe, the aensitive appetite. haVtt been attracted to or

N-

ulaed frau. the same object (..hich, be it noted, i. now modif:1ed, or informed,

2.3 I.!., 1...11, 65, 1 c: tI (ji] ulla virtu. morali. poteat .ine prudentia haberi
o quod propritllll virtutia morali. eat facere electionem rectam.. ••• Similiter
ti.. prudentia non poteat haberi nili habeantur virtutee morale a : cura prudentia
it recta ratio agibll1\11'1, quae, sicut ex principiis, procedit ex. fini.bua
glb1l1m, ad quos allquie recte se habet per virtutea moralea. ft Cf. also: De
in. Cardinal., 2 cJ 8:r., I-II, 58, 4 c and ad ); 64, .3 CJ 61, .3 and 4; and',
inallY, >8, 5 c: "[Ald rectam rationem agibi.l.1.Dt, quae eat prudentia, requiritur
ad homo habeat virtutem moralem."
.
24Bea1des the locations in the Suaa given in the preceding note, eapeciall
ertinent ia the section in De Virt. Cardinal., 2 c (ad fin.).

--

251.1., I-n, 57. S c: I1{fJrudentia est virtue max] .. neceesaria ad vitam
'UIIlanam • • • • Cull aut_ el8Otio sit eorua quae aunt ad finem, rectitudo electi
• duo requir1t. 8Oi110.t debita t.1.nemJ et id quod conven1enter ordinatur ad
ebitum. fin_. .Ad debita alItem fin_ homo cOIlV'enienter dispon1tur per virtuta
uae perficit partem an:1Jaae appetitiV'am, CuiU8 obiectura .st bonum. et finis. Ad i
utem. quod convenienter in finem debit_ ordinatur, oportet quod hano direct.
aponatur per habit_ rationia.
rudenti ."
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~ the end, as matter by its form 26 ), and they are either aiding or conflicting ,
with the will and the reason. 27 low, this process take8 place :in preparation
for every actual intention, for the will has a choice of intending or not intending.

In other words, the act at intention i8 itself the matter for choice.

But an actual intention i8 thought of as issuing from some habitual disposition since habits are the sources of acts.

ItUncie virtus quae facit bene &gere

in actu, non solum in facultate, oportet quod .el 8it in ipsa voluntate; vel in

aliqua potentia secundum quod eat a voluntate mota •• 28

Hence, if in the process

described above the practical intellect is disposed either for gooci or for bad,
and the sensitive appetites are correspondingly disposed, then the will i8 itself going to be disposed either to good or to bad,29 and should an acc.sioo tor
intending a good end present itself', the will would cormaturally tend to the end
if it is well disposed, or aTold the end, it' ill disposed toward it.

The will t S

freedom 1s not taken from it, but it truly 1s disposed as it by a habit ot its

own to pursue a certain end more easily, fin,ll.y, and pleasantly than to pursue

26!.Ie, II-II, 4, 3 c ... [A]ctus voluntar1l speciem: recipiunt a fine, qui
est volmtatis obiectUlll. ld aut em a quo al1qtd.d speciem sortitur s. habet ad
modum formae in rebus natval1bus. Et ideo ouiuslibet actus voluntarll forma
quodammodo est finis ad quem ordinatur J tum quia ex ipso recipit speciem, t'Ulll
etiaa quia modus act1ooi8 oportet quod respondeat proportic:naliter tini.a
27~., 56, 4 ad 3. BSed irascibilia et concupiscibills non ad nutum obediunt rationi, sed babent proprios motus suos, quibus interdua ration! repugnant." Ct. also --....
De ..................
Virt. in .......-.
Comm., 4 c.
26 Ibid., 3 c. Ct. also 88, 3

-

CJ I,

93, 7

OJ I-II, 71,

3 ad 2.

29Ibid., 56, 4 ad 4t -[IJn electione duo sunt. scilicet intentio tinis,
quae pertIiiet ad virtuta moral.; at praeacoeptio eius quod est ad finem, quod
pertinet ad prudentiam; ut .d1eitur in VI ~th12. Quod autem habeat rectam intentionem finis circa passiones aniaae, hoc contingit ex bona dispositione lrascibilis .t ccmcup1scibilia. E't lC:l;v virtutea morales circa passionea, sunt in
irasciblli et concupiscibili." Alsoa ~., S8, 4 and S.

18
he ccmtl"U7 end.

Tbera1"ore, before :1.t act. tor an enG, the

diapoeed cme W&7 or the other, tor the good. end or the bad.

to a certia1D extct, its own do1Ilg.

ow theae diapo8itims to

~

wm 1. alreacl7 p
1'b1a cCIld1t1C111 is,

SJnce 1t la71d.thin the wiU's panr to

111 tbe aoul or to rid the aotal. of

tttea.

mere

cl1Datng to or retue1q the _d proposed, the last _, ot intent.1<m has give pract10al intellect and the aenaitive appet.1tea their or1entatima. Bence
ral 1IIputab111t;y i. referred to the rill aDd,

throush the will,to the euppoait

ID other worda, the habitll&l. 1n'-t.1oa "'e haTe b. . aeek1l1g reters, traa
OIle aspect, to .. inteU_ which ia Bot aotual.ly being produced b7 the will,ll

which 1JOUld

.0" l1kel1'

18 disposed.

be pro4uaed

b7 tbe will,

It would proc_d boa the will

-.1O)'a the bHdca
ot

or

1nev1tab~,

. .ept that the

'rca cother upeot tbe habit

to chooae the cODtrar.y.

iDtaDUcm ntera to ,be habitual diepoa1tioa

beea__ that 18 the..., the

the IOlIl, which tile 1Dclude.

CIll7 the w1ll blR WO \be tacnll:'i•• wh1ch channel the w1ll ad

re. .' ata_. abide as .ips ot the

t.

.111' a laat

who..

deliberate cholce.)2

301_!., I-II, lB, 6 c . . . up br1etl7 the thoqht of MD7 previous articl••

role 1n the moral act I 8Ita aut.. q1&Od eat ex parte 'V01UDtat1a, ..
t ut t01'Ule ad ld quod e.t ex parM merion• •tua. qu1a 'YoltIDtaa utltUJ"
ria ad aa-cha, a1cut 1ruJtl"\B8Bt1a J ne. . actus exterioNa halMrlt ratlcua
oralltatl., nia11nqUllDt\1l aunt volvn'tal"11.- La..., in 20, 1 0, where the
goodne•• or ulloe of __ mal.
1s diacua.ed, the .... o<I'&Clu1OD iaupheld.

on the will

ten.

.t.

could be cited. I-II, 1, 1) 71£, 1, De Ver., 24, 1 c (where
-.phaa1. 1. laid vpcn the suppoait aa the pr1nc1ple Ol Ii. . act.).
l"'or ttpotent1al.lyu, a 'Y1rlU0U8 man t a will 1. e1ther habttully or act'tall.7
otiler

1ntend1De a good end, ntta1n1DC, hOlfeT8r, ordtnarily, the potency to 1ntcd _
end.
)2In the De 'er., 24, 10 st. Theaa. baa IlUCh to ..., about fNe choice and
obat1nac,. that baa epactal. retelW10e to tM. utter or hab1twal ectioo. He
ata'Ml that a IUD can naedJ the l'Ill"Pa ot pa.a101l b;r being r1ght17 d1epoaed regarding the end, that a fala. Jud,__t ot reaaon about a parUcular object CaD
at_ traa pua1<m or a bad habit, that a1n can baccae 'natural' to the rill.
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Habitual intention .. nevertheleS8, must not be made entirely equivalent to
~abitual disposition.

The habitual intention i. an habitual disposition, but an

habitual disposition need not be an habitual. intentim.

A man, or the soul, or

the will, may be said to be habituall7 disposed toward any good or any evil;
thWJ, a man may have an habitual disposition to steal, to lie, to be lazy, etc.

But the habitual intention leems to stand Chiefly tor an habitual diap08ition ot
the will !! .!!!!!.!! regard

!2.!h!. £!'OPer .!!!!!. !!!.!!!;

tion is either good or bad.

thus, one'. habitual inten-

Yet it may also be considered with regard to any

end, and thus one might be .aid to haTe an habitual intention of ."ea.l1.ng, ot
lying, etc., after one has deterained to steal or lie, but at present must
attend to other tasks in no wise connected with the projected wrongdoing.

In

this case ot an hahi tual intention ot SCIIle lIi.deed, one" will is indeed disposed
~th a habit, or better, i, dieposed in a JIl8lUler siallar to being disposed by a

~bit (for this le_. why the di!poaitio is habitualis and not habitus).

'!'he

~abitual intention 1. more a dispolition than a hablt in the strict Thomiltic
"~I

fterminology.

.AJ.ao, the habitual disposition _ • • Jlore a ·pbYllcl.l' realiV,

the habitual intention more a 'metaphysical' realit7J that Is, it both
iapplied to the soul, the tOl1Ur de_ribel the soul with its

te1'lllS

ine~tiona

are

both

-

rational and sensible, while the latter describes the soul and Its powers as
Iorieltated to the end.
~akes

thUll, tor example, a tramp steeped in Ticious babits

an act ot love ot God just betore lapsing into unconsciousness} hi. intel-

p.ect and irascible and conoupiscible powers are, in one way, habltually disposed
ito e'fil, and are also, sO to speak, poor physical wreaks} but thanks to the ,ood
~tual

intelt!on ot hi. will betore he lost consciousness, his powers are bah!tu-

ally reterred or orientated, to their proper end.
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It i. po••ible nc.: to retum to St. fhomaa h1maelf tor an explanation of
the infiuence ot an habitual intention on the aOralit7 ot an act.

But betore

this retum i. aacie, how mllOh can be concluded .trc. the nature of an habitual
intention, a. this nature has been explained by the author ot this the.i • .,
Because, tor a man to pertom moral acta, he auet 1I'1ll th_ dellberate17,

and because a aan'. habitual intction in no wise is an ,!!!. either of reason or
of will,

then it folloo that a :un should not merit according to his habitual.

intention, bn anq acoorcl1ng to hisactual intentions.ll The sleeper, the drunk,
the aad man do not urit or lo.e merit for their actions in their re.pective
state..

The man who tran.'re•••• the moral 1_ onl7 sU£htl;r doe. not merit for

hi. good habitual intention, and loaea urit for hia bad actual intention.

In a

dift.rent relation, honTer, the habitual intention does haYe moral consequence.
,or the hab1tuJ. intention indio ate. the bent ot th. will, it. present incU.
Ination, it. la.t cho.en orientation to t he end ot righ1; rea.on.

Though the

aleeper and the drt.lDk, on regaining their u .. of reaaon, could ohange their pre"

..nt di.position because ot their tree will, their will in ita disposition now
remain. fixed in the direction (.ither tor or again at its proper end) 1..,
deliberately decided upon.

Will the worda of St. t'h<»1&8 substantiate the preceding ettort. to expres.
~. understanding

lin which

of habitual 1atention? It . . . . that thq will.

The passages

St. Thea.. mentions habitual intention or matters related are not n.eJ'lo

pus, and none of th_ describe it at length.

But the ta that can be gathered

.utfice to indicate st. Thanas' conception and use of the term.

J3 Both actual and virtual. 1Btent1on. are here designated ty the one phrase.

This firat text a.aiat. in understanding what at. Thaaa. meant b7 the word
habitual.

"Omnia aut_ intel1eotUII in hab1tu per &llquaa .pee1e. intell1g1t t

naa hab1tu. 'Yel eat hab1l1tatio quaed.am intelleotu. ad recip1enda apee1e. inte11lg1b11es qu1bus aotu fiat inteUlgen.) vel eat ordinata aggregatio ipprua
speeier\a ex1stentl_ in intellectu non, secundum cOJIlple1na &Ot_, ..d aed:1o modo
inter potentia et actUll.

lion e.t igltur in 1plO (DeoJ hab1tual1a sc1ent1&.

Praeterea, habltua quaedam qualitaa .st.

Dec aut. non potest nee qual1tas neo

aliquod &Colden. acoldera • • • • Quia yero dispoait10 qua qui. eat hab1tu tanta

conaiderans aut yolens vel agens a.s1m1latur disp08itionl dol'lll1ent18, h1nc est
quod David • • •

rreaori.~

hab1tual_ diepoa1t1ons a Deo.,,34

Next, eme .t'1nda him re.terr1ng to the hab1tual diapo.ition of the m1nd,which
frequently mean. for him the higher faculties ot the soul, both intellective and
appetitive.

"Habltu1. Taro propria e.t ut inclinet potenti_ ad agendum quod
.

CODvwt habitui inquantUII facit id nderi bonUll
quod el l"8pugnat.

.

qu~d

e1 oonven1t, malua auta

Slout a1m guatu. d1iudioat sapores secundum sua d1epos1 t10-

nea, 1ta DUms halin1s d1iud1oat de aliquo fac1endo ..ound... au_ habitual_

dispoai tiona: unde et PhU080phua dlc1t, in III Ethio.
, quod • qualis lUluaquS.S"
est, talis fini. v1detur 81' .1t3.$ Another time he deaor1bes the effect ot a hab1t of virtue,

-(BJab1tUl rtrt.utu !nolinat hEn_ ad reot. agend'tlm, seoundula

quod per Ip.am hcrao habet recta aestimat1on. de tine, quia, ut dic1tur in III

Ethi:..·, quali. unuaquiaque eat, tali. et tW. v1.detur ei.

S1cut en1a gustua

ludioat de sapore, aecundua quod est attectU8 aliqua bona yel mala di.po.1t1one,

34£.Q., I, 56.

3>!.!.,

II-II, 24, 11 c.

ita 14 quod eat cOIlveaillla hc.a1n1 pcund_ ha'b!tal. diapos1t101l_ lib! 1nhaelWlt_, bona vel mal .., utt1Utur ab eo ut bomaS quod auWa ab boo d18Cordat,

aeatiJlatur ut aal_ at repupllD•• .,36 It..... aa1d \hat habltual. tntenUon . . . .
to stand.

oh1e.t'~,

though not excluaively, for an habitual dUpo.ition of the ..11

•• eeen in regard. to 'the proper end. of

1lUl.

1he pnoad.1n, two tate c&r17 eOlle

hint of ..lat A. Thaua' Idnd Will be in that

recard,

tor ill both he baa ooa-

neeted the noUOIl of babltul diapoatiOJl ..ith the notlon of II1d. Ba baa not
ap_en 7'Jt of the hab1tvaJ. intention, but ..heu he doe. it will n ......rily be
in

t.m.

of

811

_d..

the nat puaap dilaOll8\.ratee that bab!hal. MRopit:l.OIl ac:aeUmee could be

replaoed. d1reoU)r b.J:

habt~ul

utcUan. and po1Dt. O1&t that the habitual. int__

t i . or d:l.lPoe1t1c i. the neult of \he last cl»1c..

·[F]er baptl __ etiaa

adult! l1"at1ala auci,ere poe.-t 1rl d.ol'Jdado, quia 4(UoIIl'ria nOD. u.1t acutal.1a

diapoaitl0 ex actuali ao\u volDtati., adeat ta8Il babltul1a diapO.itl0 ex

motu 11ber1 ubitJ'lL1 praeoedent•• .J1
.A

ereat

naber of ft.

lb.....

•

ret.reDO•• ·~O an hUitul int_ti_ ocour in

oOllDeoticm with h1a explanat1_ of the

."iIl, of the "'rele, "!IIou IIhalt 1"".

the lord. th.,. God nth tb7 "ole he&1"\.-

IDeri.t.ab17 _. '1baua 1f1ll di.t1Dp1ab

the yano_ ...,.. in which a pentCB oan 10.... God.

h: pan. veJ"O d:U1aenUa carltae dioltur pert..ta qaando 'eJ.1clu1.....
omd_ tot. __ pea .. cDlipt. Quod quida continait tr1pllc1~r. Uno
1IOClo, aic C(l1od. to1na oor h.'.la actl1Al1ter ..-pel" fuatv 1n Bra. E\
haec ••t perteoUo caritatia patriae: quae non e.t po.liblli. in hac vita..
in qua iJlpoa.a1blle ••t, propter hlDUU'la. vitae 1ntlrm1tat_. 88mpter actu

eogitare de Deo et mover!. dileotlone ad 1pawa.

3~ ...;Cari,;;;,,;;;,;;.t., 12 c.
311! IV!!!!., 11, 1, 3, 2, act 3.

Alio modo, ut heJllo atud.1lD1l

aUla deputet ad vaaandmB Deo at rebUil d1:dm.8. prutem&ais alJ.la n1ai
qwmt.um nec.u1t&e praesenti. vitae requirit. It ieta ••t perfectio carltaU. q. . ear\ poaaibilla 111 via. non taen· e.t c . .a1e omnibus caritatea
habentlbua. Tertio Bodo, ita quod habituallter allquia totum cor 8UlD
ponat in DeOt ita _w.o.t quod h1hU cogltet vel vilit quod 81t di'rl.D&e
d11ectian1 cQfttrar1um.. It haec p.rteatio eat camaun1a aanibua caritde
habentibws.3 U

In another place he . . . .

.t., 1'"

0Dl.7 • t1rotold

"IIao quldem 1Il0d0, in

diat1nctiCX'lr

ut wt._ Gor hOllin1• • •per actual1ter in De. feratur. Et ieta eat

perteotio patriae. .All0 &040, 1ft habit,.ater tot_ cor hOll.1D1& 111 De_

t.~

turl ita .,1110e' quodrUhU cent"' Dei dlleet1C1l_ cor haD1n1a 1'Mlptat.-39 An
on. ueed ph:ra.. i. the .-t.at.ent tha' -quod. eB1a _tv:1D peacato TfJD:Salt,

propter Deua ..tv habitll, et.a1neo ..tu. J&o . lil th•••
the third,

.eN .ore cpre.. unU..

habitual ret__.e, or d1reoUOIl,

01'

~

".-..nte,

ill \he pnri.oua

~.

panicl1lar17

is . . ot an

1nt8llUon (ltpropter DauIt-) olone '. love,

ft. !h. . . 18 pl.a1nll' tJdnk1nS ot an habitual. 1Dtentbn which 1. an habitual

diapoa1t1eo ot '\he

win 111th

.reprd to Oocl, the

1&n end ot un.

the 1... ot hab1tul1t)r ocoua ill other:,oontext.e al.o.

aO'Jo&1tere dicl"

tv dupl101ter.

.1110.t . . .d1a uta, .t ,..cnmdml habit• • Act1l qld.... 1»-

poeAbil. eat .... hcao e.tiJiue poen1teat I ,1&1& neoe... e.t ..ott actue poen1-

_Ue, Ave interior 81. . exterior, 1aterpolet.v, ad II1m1I .-ao et al11a

.t

quae

act nece,.itat. Corpori8 perUDent. A110 sodo Act'v poen1tere aecnm. . habi-

t_.

a1c oportet fl1loc1 hcao oontinue poen1t. .t: et

qUlmtum

ad hoo quod han

nUJ'lqua al1,u:Ld ccm'trula tao1at poen.1terlt1ae, per quod hab1tualia d1apoatt10

·.

poen1\ent.i. tollatvJ at quant._ ad hoo quod _bet. :1n prop08lt.o genre quod ....
per .ibl peocat.a praeterit.& diapliceant..· 41 Den71n1 the neoe.sity of aot.ual
penitence

f'o~ ~he

rats.ioa. of' venial

8m., st.

1'bca.. addae

.~

tam_ autticl

habituaJJ.8 dilpl1centia, quae habet.ur per habit._ carlta18 ".1 poeD1t..Ua.
tJncle ",u1t.ul' Cluod reClu1rat.ur ....,edaa Y1rt.uaU. d1epl1o

riuti•• quia. • ••

ia.Jt2 lJ1 both of the.. cOll'kd. the act, _acribed are not iat.enU. . ot the
J hOtre'fW, th...

_t.

are pl'OdwJt. of t.he tIlt.atic md slgn.

.,.P8, thentoN, h.lp lllustrate St..
eouem1ng the 1nt1umc• •_l'C1.ed

St. 1'haua 1. expl1olt.

fh~t

or 1t..

The

tmdar.tCu.t1nl of' bablt.ual1t7.

bt the habltual 1ntentlC1ft

OIl

aoral act.,

·[~n pller.1a non poteat .... oontrar1.a vol_ta.

1'1"_

t.\\ n.._ habltu. 1'\ ideo nOll recald.r:l.tv "ol_ia. ".1 intent10 in 81., . .
rohibeaa l"8aOV8&tv.
CDtrar:La

Ia ._Ubua au'- .t dondentlbu pot..t .... 'Volaw

hab1t1l&l.1., qua'f'i8 nOll .1t aotuall.. :1\ 1.0 ad. ante

s~_

".1

r:t._ hel"tlDt cont.l'IIriM "ol__t18, nc reo1p1..t. 'Mre.Dtla, . . adhuo 11la

ol_taa hDltulit.er
tio

-tv.. 1D Dera.

auet.-43

Ap1D,

"lir]~ autt101t .runo habltulJ..
'.

C(1d.a ex hoo quod. e.t 11'1 hablt.u, null_ aretv, sed u

0:rd:1-

hoc

actu operatur. leo t __ oportet quod lat_tlc utulia ordinan. in tiD_
t1Ila ait eaaper CCDj'tlllCta cutl1'bet acUord. . . . dic1tur in alJ.. . . t1D_pro-

. J eecl auttiolt quod. allqt111lde ..tualiter . . . . 1111 tiDe. 1D t1Dea ultia_

erantv •

1cl

.w..

Though this pG81tlon M'7 ••• 011 tlrat

11". to contradict what

.

84, 9 o.
JaIbid., 87, 1 o.
LlIn IV Sent_, 6, 1, 2, 3,
Ibld., III,

- ~ n !!!!., 40, 1, S,

ad 2.

ad 6.

Ct. also DeVer., 24, 12 c.

he baa .aid about tbe ha'b1tual loye ot God beiD, enoup tor a un, the oppoeiUGIl dieappeara when 1t 1. no4ied that St. Th0M8 ft. eq.1Dg that the hab1tual

lew. ot God 1. -oaah to ke." a un trca sinD1nIJ :l. t doe, not, however, _ri t

tor h1a.
The final text juat1t:l.e. the .taDc1 that the habitUl intention of the will,

aark1D, the Met reo_t cIel1bera\e oho:l... ot the will, de\eND•• iih. 1UUl' •
••:raJ.

.ut..

. . .t

b7 hU1-' &leo, tor tabit•. are

GaD

CO em to

Here ft . . . . . po1Dta out tb. f!4't that ill

Alnn,

1.....
UrID.,

as 1a

and 11, 1, l, 2, ad 3,
aal.., or

. .U.

& ••rta1D

......

the pl"iDo:l.pl_ of act•• wJ.th thi. 'baai, he

!! IY .!!!!., 6,

1, 2, ), ad I (tuo'eel .just above)

t, w1ll baa aoral 1ntl-.. _. *. he 1,

\hat, & . .

-liiJ.1Wl1lr.t bab1tibu

et _tib• • aed

aati_

qu&a11aatZ"Q-

_ate ....Ual1t.er ..n ._, ae4 haldU1:tq,. . prinet . . nl"t1ttibu ....a d1811mr ••16

tld.&

oipU. M1'll.tora,
!h:l.. ohapt.r

bea- with

. . . ft&l probl_.

. . e&pft. . . .

&ppeuI.1Mt. . tlw habit-

at all, cd . , . tarther trca
,
\he w:Ul. .enrihel• •, _oard1ag to the Jd.ad. ~ ft. fhcaa •

ual. :l.DteDU. w.. .tar :r.arec1
be1Dg a hab1t of

be:1.na a

to all

t~

1D the , . upUc1t

~1t

menace.

to

~.

hab1tual1ntentl., by

babitul
:t.n\eUae 18 an _at that .....up l'eprw_a'U.D, the _tualllltent1ca
,

whicb 1. pre.n.d 1n the po.sibl. :i.ntell..t. It aun • ___ be a habit or
ct1apotr1t1_ of th. 1dll. •
.lt thU atap ot iihe :i.nTeat1pUCft the author .ugpeted. a 101uUon 1n tea.

ot a d1apGe1Uca ot the

w1ll wh1oh ..... the reaultant of the habit. ot tbe intel-

lect and. the . . . . appet1te. and the will it.alt.

4SJ!

m .!!!l.,

0, 1, 3, l, ad 1.

rus aplaatiOil ...... to

46
accord

tul.l1 with the mind of St. Thaua as far as can

be deterained by hi.

treatment ot the aoral virtues, the habits ot the Will, and, finally, the habitual diepoa1ticm of the will.

The chapter ooncludes with a cliscussioo of the

JIloral. influeace ot the habitual intmtion.

em,iatently with its nature, it

was shOlm. to haTe no influence wbatwer upon the goodness

0:1;"

malice

or

an act,

though the habitual. inteation ot the last end repre88ftta the 11111'8 own dispo-

sition with regard. to 'the propel" end t4 h . - action.

CiAPDll III
VIRTUAL II'tIJ'J.'IOI. ItS NATURE

'fhu third ohapter 1. to deal primarily wit.h the nature ot virtual inten~ion.

Preceding, howeYar, w111 b. a brief pl"8..ntaUan of the notion of

ri,rtual. togethel" with the Y&1")'1.ng marmara in whioh

st. th. . . ued it in

:anneotlon with the act ot tntent1on •
....ral cl1fterent phraaings o! the Bot1en of nrtual intention recur tre-

;uently. One ot the moat popular with Stt. thoma8 is "to refer virtually", as
In. •

[qJ uod omnia virtute "terantur

in Dena, hoc partinet ad pertectiooaa cari.-

~atis ad qua.a O1'IIllea tenentur",l -(.\11100 est habituallter refer" in

De_,

aliucl virtualiter.,,2 -to intact virtual.ly" ocour. in the saae passage.
I:ua, dum coll1g1t h al"ba. act1l, intendlt

cont.~eere

et

"[II]ed1-

potion., nihil tort...lil de

.anitate coglte.u., virtuallter tamen intandit aanitat_, propter quam potion.

~t.·)

Very popular with

~tention in terms of "the

It. thomas, too, is hie explanaUOR of the 'Y1rtual

tore. (or virtue) of the first intention" I

...

in.

~(JJ on oportet ut semper aliquis cogltet d. ultlllo tine, qwmdocUlllque &liquid

"ppetlt ...el operatur, aed virtue primae intentionia, quae ••t re8p8ctu ultimi
irinis, unet 1n quollbet appet1tu cuiuSCUlllQue rei, etiam . i de ultimo fine actu

--

lDe Cant., ll, ad 2.
2
Ibid., ad 3.
)

-

-

Ibid., ad 2.

47

pan coptetv_ S:iout nan oportet quod qui Tad1t per vi_, in quol1bet paaau
poptet de tine,.h. .met aut_ (attent10 in orat1ane) aecl1Dduta virtut. • • •

~1ai tantoa tiat evagat10,

quod <lIIIl1ino depereat vis pr1mae intentioni.,·S and

(where 8\_ Theau is apeak1ng ot virtual :1nt.tmt1an and baptJ..>, ttlllde, a1 post.-

lea 1n ipao exercitio aotua coaitat10 e1ua ad alia rapiatur, ex virtute primae
lint.entiCllia perficit.v sacraent.__ n6
Let. it be Doti.ed that. 1be phra.. !2. !HI !. virtual intention does not
~ur_

!! int!!u:l yiJi!!alllaoat l1ear17

.reter T1rtll!Hl'- But, atr.1.Uy

approaches it.a equivalent, or perhaps

~kin"
/"

I&a CD. might oorreot,q

CI'l. doea not. lI&ke
----- a virtual

be aa1cl to make an actual intention.

00-

!!

intentim,

One acts'!.i1l! a

lvirtual int_ti_, or one .2Y. a virtual int.tIltion in his aetim. 7
Th... who are t_Uiar with the vocabulazoy

or

It. Thana. might 1f'811llOnder

IWhether or not be here __ a virtual no dUtel'Gnt17 tram his us. o£ it in such

jph...... as. ·each

,If••

thill, aiat. virt.u.al.ly in 1t.8 principle, ,,8 "both utter and

preex1a\ ."iriuall7 :in God, as :1a the

pr~.rd1al cause of both,·9 and uwh_
"

the tora of 811 etfect 18

Tirt~

in ita cauae, it 18 like its active caus. aa

regarcia all that. ewer which t.he ponr of t.hat caUl8 extends. alO

4!.I., I-II, 1, 6 ad J.
oS.!!. If !!!!!., lS, a, a, 4 801.
6.!.!_, III, 64, 8 ad l.

-

7Cit. 1b14. Bere "hab1tulla 1Dtentiot' 1. . .eel tor y1rtual intention.
8!_!_, I, 93, 1 c.

9~., U7, ) c.

-

lOIb1d., lOS, 1 c.

'I
!'

St. fh.... t om explantian i . tOlJl'ld beat in the- c..mt& !!!. ~ !Jm"eace•
.. i . an••ring two d1f't1CJultie. about prayer& the tir.t cOIltencia that apparent-

fJ.7 • un

1_ to Pl"&7 without oeasing. the aecond argue. that actual attmtion

..... a necessitl' in pra,er. Hi. repl,. to the t1rst begin. by stating two ...,..
in whioh an,- aot i . aaid to endure. aaut .ecundum e._anU_. aut secundum. virtu-

t., ai...e .tt.ctua eua. e10ut mo\io • .1ue qui lap1d_ pro.1101t, durat per ......
U. actu d_ unua lapidi .ovando appenit. aed Yirtlll JIOUan1a un.... da lapia

ex ri. 1IIpule1C1l1. priJaae Jlovetur. aU Th. he app11e. the principle to the pro1>-

1_ of pra18l', which 1. of intereat here because it exaaplifies how the principlA
will b. applied to other situation. alao.
dvatic pote.t duplioiter GOI1ld..derari.

-Similiter et1aa dico quod orationi.

Vel aecnmdua 88sent.ia actus.

Et de DOl

debet aliClu1•• <attnue Ol"8l'8 .el .eaper, quia oponet eU_ interdum cirea alla
aoc'Gp&ri..

Vel ..etmd_ v1:rt1l'tea. It a1c ejUi 'Y.1rtua praee ipue qwmtum ad eu1

_1n1tilll llaDet in caliDUS operi.bua alii. quae tac1Drwl, ordinate, quia omnia aci Ti-

tam ..tea_ habenda oJ."dinazoe debeaus. It 1.deo ._ider1a rltae aetemae quod
"

eat orat1C1'd. pr:1nelpi_, unet in amibua operibua Doni. aeeundum ...irtu'_. It
propter hoo 41c1tur in 01081& I lb......

tliClll

ce...t orare q\U non ce••at bale

agere. t tlU
To reply to the second d1ttioult,. St. Thoma. returnl to the distinction he

haa made, and nOir introduoe. a third el_mt to cOlIplete the picture, nam.ely,
aining in habit.

-Sicut tm1a diet_ est, al.1qui. actua unet per essenti_ et

virtute qundoqueJ led quaudoque trana1t acta et mmet Virtute, sieut in ex __

Ul!.

-

n !!21., lS,

12lbid •

4, 2, l .01.

it.ic man.1"8 act_ in virtute eat quldaa

lQ de project1cm. lapidi. patmt.

dilll modua inter 1p._ •••• 111 habltu et in aot1.1.J quia quod ill habltu eat,

aque Yirtute n.qu. per ...ent1ala actus e.t.

Seeundta hoc ergo dico quod. att.....

io in oration. aanere debet a_per ae,nandtlll T1rtut_••ed nOll requiritur quod
per JR.eat per ••aent1aa. actua ....lJ
IBaediateq he prooeede to the object1ona, and hi. thiJ:'d and fourth responae. giye further olar.Uication of hia lJIlderatanding at this virtuality.

-Ad

erti. diAulilld'ta quod ucendit intelleatu. in Dea, ,uando oration. ad De_
ordinavit, et

Yin. Uliu aacenau.

_ ClUod in openb_ virt.U_

nOll

in to'. orat100.e anet.

Ad q'llal"tlB die ...

QPortet quod .-per actuali_ electio adait,

cut non oportet quod 1J.le qui el. .~am dat, seaper de 81e_.,... oogttet,
d pftio1t ....l oopt. . . . . . . .l . .o~ dare

diapo811:l:~J

nisi cClDtraria

oCitat1c. praeoe4eDa in\8nt10 1nt.rruapatur •..l4

Th.refo", how does It. tho. . -under nand. a virtual 1ntent1oat Ie .... it
the continued ex1atencs of the actual int_t1cnin it. effect. !he actual
,
tantian i. Dot pr••8.1t iu.lt, but its Wlu*,ce and cauaat10n raaaine. ·the
~tio

18

Yinuall, beeau.

13Ibid •• 4 _01. In the

~.

acrtuJ. int_tion is le.....ing it.1apNas OIl the

a_

.
...
book
of the ,QGlUDtm'
16, 2,' 2, 2aol., St.
homaa u;e. the triple d1v1a101'l tor the act ot .ontd
but thsre the appl1atlQ.D 4itfer. al1,htl~ and. the lIiddl. (v1rt~!) . . . . an 8UJIlpla of an interretat.1ys tntenticlu -LC]ontritio poteat _cipi tripl1c1terc .,.e1 actu, vel habiW, 't'el alld10 modo. labitu '1111_ eontrit,10 aKutan•.nan autt1cit ad peceat1
en1alla d:1Jl1••1cm_ . . . . . I . it.ena requiritur quod semper 81t actual1, conritioJ qu:l.a e• •retur quoci p8C<Jat.lII quod qui, in m-.or1a vel in cognit1.e nCll
8t, r81tti nan po...t. .It ideo diceruba quod. requiriturcontr1t10 _dio
o,4,11oInd.o ae1l.iCJet etei &ctu peccata non d1eplioeat explicit., d:1apl1cet
en implic1teJ quia ex virtute '-ot.. quam agtt, aequeretur dtapl1cent1a expl1ita peceat1 ven:1al1a., ai cogitat.io ad mud. ferretur .. -

---

14lD If Sent., 15, 4, 2, 4,

ad.

onJ

3 ad

ad

4.

tic at hand. A virtual intention then (it the term _y be ued, tor St. Thos . . . . to

b._

avoided the term) designate, the causative infiuen.e ot the

tual intentiCill. To say, aA.ll one needs 1. a Yirt.ual :Intention," 18 to .ean
bat "All OI'le neecla i . for the ro:rce, or infiuenc.,
Il"VllUUiJI."

ot the actual. intention to

Thua, -rtrtually to refer .omething t.o God" (e.g., an act of alaap.v-

81gn11'i.. that, thoup one doe. not now have an ut.ual :l.DtentiCll ot God. a.
e end, still QUe

t.

ebo1ce, deliberation, use, and other act. of the will and

the intellect are truly being referred to God. beeauae
tual intention.

I:a. u

ot the 1n1'll81ce of the

habit.ual reference of an act of alJuciT:ing to God, co

the other had, the ,1vm, of alJlls 1a in no wi.. being referred to God.

Better

o S&7 that the w1ll (Iloe had referred t.he act to God, bs now the will i . anl.7
apoaed 1n a certa1n W&7 toward. d1recttag tbe act of alII.r!T1na to God.

It W'Ol1lcl be 4uite pos.ible, but also quite moorreot, to UDderpcd Y1rtu&II

apprNOhing verT near17 :i.n mean1ag to p!!_t1aJ.1. J 111 thi.

.

8&8e

the 1ft-

ention 1f01Ild. be virlual1. becau.ae it doe. Bot &Ot\1&lly ai,t. but. i . Dear to
'.

stenee beG a._ of the as..t.ence ot 1t. ca.... (s).

"

It 18 this ... mc ...111g

ch 18 IOlUld 1n tbe phraae. quoted near tbe beginninl

or

W. ohapter, all 01

hioh d••onbe an elteet aa 'rirtual.l7 existing in ita prineiple.

Betore thi.

hapter i . eru.d, how....er, it will be clear that It. Thoau, when Ulling yin.....

a in connection with the intention, \1I:\deratanc1a it aecord1ng to the tirst

an1ag explained) that 18, as the continued existence of the actual 1ntention
in it. cauaaticm.

The aeccmd aeaning grenada what 1. called the interpret&UT.

tentiOD. a Vpe which St. Tbeau did not con8ider, but. wh10h will shoJ'tl.y come
up tor diacuas1cz. again 1n this and in the tollOWing chapter.

Great care must be uaed in interpreting any })Usage in which St. fhcmaa

S2
~plo:r.

theae three terma of !Ctua1;tl, viri!!Ul. and bab1 ttraUl. lint ot all,

his cOIltemporar1a., CaJetan tells us, were ua:in&

ba~tul

when we would now eq

virtual, and St. ThCll1&8 saaetimes accaamodated h1mael.t to the current uaage. lS

Seccm.dl:y,. the 'term actual. often s1t1lifie. both actual and v:1rtual. 16 !hue It.

thoma. att1l'118 the iapo••ibillty of a
sleop

)I'Qat

lUll'S

.

continual actuJ. repen.tance becau..

inte:rrapt.11 Ap.in, he states that the preeept

the glOl'7 at' Ood- can se. that an
oni noat.l"8e clt111bet,

DOll

111)0

everything for

"aotuali. Nlatio in DetIfJI sit conjunct. act:l.-

quidfllll in a.etu, sed in T1rtute, secundum quod virtu

pr1Jl&e ordination1s unet 1n OIIInibua actiC31ibua sequent1bu8, &icut .t virtu. t1-

~i. 1lltill1 manat in CIIIl1bua t:inibua ad ip8UIl ordinaUs.-lS
Thirdly,

.s

alreadJ pointed out, the notiC31 of virtuality- can 1t.elt ev<*e

Thus, arq actul intention can tty1rtuallT' embraoe under its wUIed

confusion.

object .ometb:1na which the m:1nd bas not attended to :I.n :l.t. dellberat:l.cm., but
which 1.

trul.:r connected with that object. 'the mind· could then bl ve an inter-

pretative intention of that object.

Du:' wbm, the mind has attended to an end

•
and the means to the end, then torget. the cdr and goe. about the execution ot
the

11""

theD tbat latter acticm. i. be

~though the

in, executed with

a "vlfl.wU- intenti<m.

d1tterenoe bet.en the two Jlea.n1nga ma:r not 1810 clearly be .een, a.

lmg .. it i . rea_bend that when "'rirtual" 1, uaed by St. Thomas to de_ribe

a type at 1ntentiCll 110 clGe, Dot .ean exactl:y the .... as when ulfsd in other
conn_101m., c QDfu1C11 will be aTo1d.ed. ngard1ng thi. particuJa 1" word.

1S2.Pera Os~, ed. Leonina, with Oajetan'. cOllllentary (Rome, 1888-1906),
XII, $).
16Ib1d., lX, }80, VI, 1). -(S]_per appeten8 quod e.t ad tin_, appetlt tin_ nOlilii.b1tuallter, sed aetualltel', ut extend1t 8e ad actauliter 810 v1rtua11te
17!.!., III, Sh, 9 ••

::::. ..-

lA"

_ ..

A.

L

=.~.,

..I.....
-. "' "'..,

.3."lt.
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Having noticed seae aspects ot the, notion and a t_ of it. usages, the next
~tep

,iema

ie to examine more
could~be

thorough~

the nature ot Ttrtua11ntention.

dran trom the citatime alre&d;y . .de,

b e acnel.

But another text or WO

giy.. 111 tall at thi. point will a.semble all the itl__t. and occasion a .ub....
quent 8ftalya,ie

or

all the factors in this type at intention.

the texts will zoe-

'fer to theolOgical "3-te. Though uttere or theolog haye no place in a
~Uo,oph1cal

etudy, ,.et their trequent 1I1tl"l1S1ca cannot be entiJ"ely eliminated

_hell ODe ie tr)'ing to fe""et out the philosoph, ot St. Thca.aa concealed in hi.

the ole&?, • All cae oan do ie JUke the neoe.aar.r ...tal adaptations trca the

q.stiens Ulel the exampl.. being rw1. .d b7 'Ule Angelio Doctor.
la this tint pas...., the topic under diacuasion is that fadliar them.e ot
lorin, CIocl.
be retened

An 0\)3_t1ca baa be_ raiee4 to the eftect that all oar act8 Jauet

""'G&l.q to God,

and not

-reJ.:r habitual17. St. tb. .s

atlpel'8t

(S]1cut ill cauie etf1clentlbua virtue pri1l&e causae _~t in ta1ibus causi, aequentlbUII, ita etiam intent10 principa.lis tini. virtute unet in
-.1bua .t1n1bus aecUftdarii., Uftde qu1cua.qu. actu intendit al1quem finem.
eeeundpiUll, virtute intend1t finem pririclpal_; sieut aedicus, d1a collilit herbaa actu, intend it cant:loere pot1m., rdbil tort..,818 de sanitate
cOgitans, virtual1ter tamen intendit aanitat_, propter qUIll potion. date
Sic igit'Ul", OUlll &liquis a.lp8- orciinat in n.., siout in tinem., 1n
C8nibUli quae propter aeipaua· tacit. unet virtute mtent:lo ultiai finia, qui
Dna eat, _de 18 canibvs ..ren poteat, ad. oar1tat. h&beat. • • •
. Ad teri1a dicendlm, quod aliud est hfb1tual1ter reterre in Dewn, at
al1ud Yirb&lJ.ter. Babltv.al.lter enD retert 111 De. at qui nihil ag1t, nee
&liquid actualiter intend!t, ut. dormienaJ aed YirtWlliter &liquid rererre
:lD lea, en -aenUa propter tina ordinantla in llea. U'Ade hablilualiter
reterre in Deum, ncn cadit aub praecepto J ..d v1nu&llter reterre c:wda in
llelB, oadit IU.b ~.pto caritat1a' eua hoc n1h1li al1ud ait quaa habere
Data ult:1mura finem.19
.

the secCl'ld text, alao alread7 seen in part, occurs in an explanaticm ot the
:1ntent1m ...h1ch a minister need. tor the validity of a sacraent.

19De Oar1t •• ll. ad. 2 and ad. 3.

It oOllee as

S4
a repq to the obJeet1cm that intEmt:l.m bear. CIll7 on

wha~

i. attended to, anel

lack ot attent:l.OI1 to one'. worela or act. 1. a CCIIIIlcn pbencaenon (the 1lIp11cation
being that o. . .quentq the naber ot valid. 8&OraMnt. would be III&ll :l.ndeed).

a[t] i.et

the reply.

me qu:l. allud cog:l.tat,

1'1_ babeat aotual. intmt:l.OIl.,

habet t_1Il habitual.., quae euttic:l.t ad pertection• •acraent1: puta

a,

0_

aac.rdoa acc.dit ad bapt1Hnc:lull, :l.nt_d1t tuere c1rca bapt1unciua quod tacit
lool.l1a.

UIlde,.1 poaiea 111 ipso .e1'01Uo act. cogitaUo e:l.ua ad alla rapia-

tur, ex ftnut. priaae iDtentim1a pertic1tur aacnaent_. Qum-i • •tudio.e
curare deb.' aaeraenU a1n1.ter ut .U_ actuala intenUCileJI adhib.at.

Sed.

boc n(ll1 total1 kr e.t podt_ 111 nfa1n1lr pot.natel qu:l.a praeter 11'1"-t1__,

.UIIl h_o vult alt_ :l.Dtmden,
"Una With a

inc1p1t alla oogitar•• • 20

virtual 1nt_tian involve., 'Ulentore, tbree P870holog1oal

activities ••peoiaJ.l7t an order:I.Dg of naaoft, a IlaUUq of dtent1on, md a
.ertain ccmUBu.t101l of

~.

aot1_ of \h. will.

laeh of tbe.. diaalda

01081'

inapeoUon •
"

..... orden.
to, the end.

It .... a n-.r of MIm."" being oClllllllOted With. directed

It.o

&rI'IIlp.

the • __ and the end tor the will tbAn the latter

move. to t.he end 11' 1t ...... to an7 ot tho.e . . . . .
ad end aut preo• • the _tual tnt_t101l.

1_.

thia or4al'iaB ot . . . .

Bat. t.hi. OrMriD, alao POOUldathe

ponib1l1V of a . . . .quant nnw intent.icm, beea•• it the will doe. ftot·_ove

!t l!!! relation !! !!!!. - .. !2!!!. :l.ntmded
the 1I1ll in DO wq toll. . "in v1rtu or" the "tirat"

to dea1re t.be . . . . bee....
the

,he &cu. ot

actual intent1on. For

ODO.

t.b1s

_ov. b...

md.
OJ"

been . . . . anet the wUl proe.... to be

ss
uay about the .ana, the will no longer is dea1ring what i . known to be related

to the cd, bu:t dewes what is, in fact, rela'hd to the end. Thi. ie what 1.

slgnit1ed by St. fhcaas' e.xaaple of the doctor'. Yirtual intention, and by the
rda, "rtnuaU.ter aliquid referre in Daua, eat agentl. propter fin_ ordinanti
in

Dna,·

ot

that oltatic:a.

a. \he .. _orda are to be lIDcler.tood in the 11sbt of the flnt port1on

It 1. of the utaoat iaporbnoe to notice caretul17 the dUtol'll1ce between
sq1a" -the rill deatre. wbat is lmOM1 to be rela'\ed to the end, n and, "the
w:Ul deatres what 1." in taat, related to the end.. n

In the toaer 1Ilataace, the

.oult. dq1r:l.DC what 1t a. the .... Uae _ . with 1t. intellec' 1. referred to
au cd, in the a8Oolld, the soul. la d.eatriac lOIlething (the brewiaC ofa aed:l.ci-

nal d.r1Dk tor example) which baa
cnl~t

!!. tacto

b_ll ordered b7 the .01Il to the pro-

of hdlth, bu\ lle1ther that p&rticral.ar order to t!ae end nor the _d

ltselt 1a at the t1ae be:1Da

.en

b7 the atoll.. t.

In the fOI'Mr 1nata.e, tur\hermore, the object being deaired ia al.o be1D1

ordered P87chol.ciCal.l.7 to the end, in the ... orul, the object being . .aired i.
no laqer ps),chologicall7 (bJ the att_tlon ot the intellect) ordered to the

act, but 1. eoaeh- po....aed. of a _

real1 ty

b7 reason

of the prenoWt

ordina-

tl_. Durin, 'he pqcholoc1oal ord.er1nathe int.eU80t .upplants ill the 1ntcti«lal order the proper lora or the obJen (the . . . .) with the tom of the IIld,
.0

that _ . the Pll7chologtoal awarene.. ot the end and. ot the order to the end.

p ..... and the aO'Ul bule. It.elt with the . . . ., thi. lat'ter haa a different

yalue

f~

what lt had prior to the

ord.eri.a,.

For

~

eat.

of oonYeD1ent di....

cr1Jl1natiCl'l b.u.en the two inat&l1O•• , let the t!rat be • •1pated. a. a pQChological order ot the _an. to the end, and. let the .econd be d••ipated. a. an

ootological order of the Ileans to the end.

function, then, the first oan

al80

rra.

the viewpoint ot the end'.

be designated .. a pQ'Cholog1cal intol'll&tia

mean. by the end, and the ...ond as an CIltololioal intoJ'llatiOll. !'hi,

of the

final point deaerve, further di.cUllaiCil1.

Ontolog1oally, the end intOI'lU the

.ean.

which hat been ordered to it in

the or4er at tinal causalit,., beeau.. the end i , the r ..... tor de.iring the
ft. ThOll... repea'" thi. many t:bae. and in aany lppl1oatiCD.8.

__ ••

For

exaple. wPJ.nia at_ ocaparatur ad iel quod ordJDatur ad tina, ,1out torma ad

:materi_,·21 and "Ix tine aut. 8ID1\ur ,\1&81 toruli. ratio Tolendi illud quod
ad tin. ol"d1natur.-22

Becauae ot this relaUcu, the will can be directed to

the aeans bee a,," it w1lls 1n th_ the end. 2)

The end and the aean8 8Clual • •

object tor the will. 2Jt further, when a un intends a proximate end (whioh ia
.quiTalent to a ..... to the reaot. end), h. lIltende both end, at the _ . tille,

21

!.!., I-II, 4, 4 o.

Ilnlc:l., 19, 10 o.

Cf. alao the appl1catlCl1l to the aayinl,

tentlan;-eiO.-, 1, 1 ad 1J 1, )

0

and 4 0, lB, 7 ad 2, 2$, 2

OJ

"Firat in :1D-

84, 2

0 •••

nn..

23 Ibid., 8, 2 0 t - . T.ro CIU. PDt ad tina, DOll armt berta Tel. TOllta
_ipaa, aed ex ord1ne ad
(hade TolUDtu in •• non. tertur, nl.i
!!I_tenu tartur in
unde hoc ipaua quod in ei. vult, .st tiDi•• - Ibid.,
~ c. a[cJ_ 1'1nia At _ada .. TOllta, id aut_ quod e.t ad
1nqunt_
tluJ:a.odi, nOll alt Tollt. Di,l propt.r tin•• manUe.t• •trt quod TOl_t&8 p0teat terri in fin., aine hoc Clued teratur in •• que nnt ad
eed in ea
quae .unt ad tin_, inqunt_ hi_odi, nan pote.t t.rri, ni.l t.r.tur in ip• •
~ropter

tin._

tiD_,

tin..

'in•• "

2~ 'er., 22, 14, ad 2, ad " and ad 4. !.!., I-n, 12, h ad 2t - (rJ m:1a,
!lnquatua iiii rea quatlda, est al1ud volUDtati. obiect_ . _ ld quod elt ad

rtn-.

Sed 1Ilquanta eat ratl0 Tolen.di ld quod etrt .d
pbiect_.-

tin.,

est

1Dl_ et id_

au the mixing of a aedicine and the giving of health. ,,2S
iiOW' again, thie informing of mean. b)" the end was .een at nece.8&17 to the

actual intentiCll.
though not ...

liow

d088

it differ for the virtual intentian? The an....r,

st. !hau. expre•••• it, 1. that in actual intention the ontologi-

cal intormation at the _an, by the end 1, acccapanied by the p.ychological informat.iCll of the mean.

b)"

the end, whereas in virtual int.ention the cntologioal

ordering obtain., but not the plQ'Chological.

By the ontological intorutian,

the aea. are de81rable b;y reaaon at the de,1rabilit.:r cd the end, nOlI" the attantion can remain aware of thi. intonaation, eo, tbat the will will, the and in the

mean., or the att.ention of the intellect can awern tram consideration Df the
cd and IhUt to the ""'" ccaa1dering the .ee. now

&8

an end in it.. own right

to which -ana are beiq ordered, 111 which oa.. the will cannot will the end

tir.t int.ended. !he preeence ot the peychololical awarene.. of, the end and: the
d••iN of the endaark the actual intention, in contra., to the virtual intction t s absence of • .,h ptqUho1og1cal direeU<)Il to the end.
In the warda

ot st. Thc:aa. the idea i . stated in this manner. -(AJd hoo

quod alicujua action!. t1nIs ait Deus vel charitae,
].a

nOll

oportet quod agendo 11-

actiana aliqui. de Deo vel eharitate cogitetJ Bec iterum suttieit quod ali-

quia in habitu tantua Deua at charitatem habeat, quia sic etiam act.. veniali.

peceati allqui. in Des ordinaret, quod f'alslJll eat: sed oportet quod prius

2S~.!., I-II, 12, 3 e. Ct. al.o 1, 15, 2 oJ

£.Q.,
eFta

III, 17; and George P.

nubenau I.J. , -the Unit)" of JbaaD Aotivi"7," Io4ern Schoolllan.. XXVII (January, 19S0), 78-79. "lb all volmtary action the
18 loiiil. _.; • • Consequ-u, .,.erJthins perUiDina \he _d 1. tamal in 'the 1d.ll _". ADd thu.
the saae act, when ordered to one end, i. under the fora at virtue; when to
ano'ther, unde.. 'the tom of 'rice. • •• And the aat of one 'rioe, ordered to the
end at another, reoeives the latter', tom."

"0
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tuerit elogitatio de fine, qui est charitas vel Deus, et quod ratio actiones sequentes in hWlC tinem ordinaveritJ ita quod reotitudo illius ordinationia in
actionibu8 eequentibus salvetur: ut patet in examplo quod Ancenna ponit de artitiee, qui, ai dum opus auum exerceret, sEmper de regula artis oog1taret,
multum in opere iIlpediretur; sed sieut prius exeogitaVit per regula. artis, 1 ta
postaodua operatur. u26

The ordering to the end 1. the important Udng. This

idea was also expre8sed in the words,
in

De_. s!cut

"Sic igitur,

CUll

aliquis seipaum ordinat

in fin_, .in aan1bus quae propter seipsUlJl tacit manet virtute

intentio ultiai tinis, qui Daus est.,,21

It is taken tor granted that the atten-

tic:n is not focused upantbe last end, God, or else there would be no talk of a
virtual intention but. ot an actual intention.

the attention, therefore, shifts.

The JDind may become attentive to the

..ans, or to what leads to the execution ot the means, or to objeete oompletely
unconnected with the_an..

The eDJIples of St. Theaaa on this point, and even

.

hi. explicit stat.ent ot the fact, seem to juatif'y thi. interpretation.
,

lor

. .ple, we haTe seen already that the intentiOn abides virtuall.ywhen a man who
begins to pray tor scae worthy Objective

SOCl'!

alipa oft into reverie. 28 Aga1n,

it is not neo••sary tor "eme who ie walking alcng the road, tI says St. Themas,

26!!!.

n .!!!!.,

)8, 1, 1, ad 4.

27 S.T., III, 64, 8 ad 3.

--

28In IV Sent., lS, 4, 2, 4 sol.; and 6, 1, 2, 1, ad 4: "[Q)uamvis lI.1niste-r
sacramenii debeat niti ad custodiendum cor SUUIII. quantum. potest, ut maxime in
verbis saoraaumtalis tormae intentiooem habeat actualem, quia tamen cogitatio
est valda 1abills, etia si tunc nan adsit actualis intentio quando verba pro~ertJ dl1Dllllodo priusintendarit et contrari& intentio non internmer1t, a&cramentm non 1mpeditur, quia operatur tunc in vi princ1palis intentionis. Jon enilll
oportet quod in opere semper intentio eonjungatur in actu, sed surricit quod
OPUS ab intentione prooedat."

>9

""0 be tb:JDkinl of the ed at

nep.·29 A. a _ttar of taot, .en cannot

flYer'1

J»h7e1ologioall,. and P81Oholog1call7 aamta1n cOIlt:rol of their att_tiOll, which
hu the thinking
no.l°

jn

abort order alOllI diTereet Un•• wheth.r tbe,. will 1t or

What i . aore, at tiJUts a lUll U torced del1b.rat.ly to re11nqutah his

attatic to the anel 01 richt rea. . and allow 1t a dinraoUOIl tor the sak. o.t
riabt reason.

"Ion c1Jl ••t contrarta T1rluU .1 raticm1a actus allquando

1Dt.ra1tut1lr al1q,uo quod .eo1llldD raU__ lit. al1oqa1n, quod a11qai. . .

s_o tradit, ....t contra T1rtut_ • .Jl
IINnwhUe, when the attention

or

the intelleot shins t1'Oll the end to the

aM'1., the 1Dtel11g1hle 8Pec1.s ot both the end and the aot o.t mtction 1tself'
are reta1Ded. in the p.sa1bl. 1ntellect, wh.re
t:1ae the peraon wtahe..

\b.,. are ready lor recall at an,.

To r ..... hi. at_tim, he hu CIIllT to ....ok. the tug.

o.t hi. put act1G11, and repeat hi. desire of that end.
The acttnt,. ot the wID ocmUDu.s. Ita consolou object no l(1\,.r is the
ad 1ntanded actualq, but tbe . . . . (UDder ~tch tea MY also b. 1acluded.
..

both the enenor ad the tnt.r.t.OI" acts 01 the" per8Oll) •

It no lODger 1. w1ll1ng

tha _an. ior the cd, &s in actual intention, but 1. 1d.ll1D.g . . . . which are,
iD tact, ordered to the encl.

It cannot w111 the order .,11c1t17. this ordering

18 not baing at\endecl '0 b,. tbe inteUect, ancl .0 not being propoaec1 b7 the
intellect to the wID.
Let 1t b. notH, in ctmleot1on with this point, that the _ ..er to a

29!.!.,
2,

4,

I-II, 1,

6 ad J.

JOe.t. !.!., nI, €>b, 6 ad J;
in contr.
J1S.f., II-II, 1$3, 2 ad 2.

--

!'!

IV

!!!!.,

6, 1, 2, 1, a4 4,

!!?!!.,

lS, 4,
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pl'Oble d1acuaed aAn7 tiua by

a.

Thaag,ll n.ely, the Bingle mot1en of the

rill to the lIleaDe and to the end, baa

i.,

In

appl.1cat1on to Tinual intention.

That

the will continue•. to 1nte.nd the aeana and the end ill one and the . . .

aoti", beo.... -Quado Tol_taa tenur in 1d quod eet ad t1n_, pro'lrt est ad

fin_,

1d quod .at ad fin_ non e.t tera1nua ejua. et ideo

ibi cluo m*a ...ll St. !haa. i. -.peald.ng here exPNsa:q

but it

AD

1101'1

or

a.'l

opoJ"tet quod e1nt

actual intention,

alao be .&14 of the "f'1rtual int_tlem that, "when \he will i . borne

to that which i. tor the end, insofar aa it ia tor the end, that .Mch ia tor
the end i . not ita to.... M

!he diltercoe in the two intentim., again, cemaiat.

in the tact t. .:&eiie actual intentim involv.. both a PS7ChOi;a~a"5 and an ontological .ovaIent riaht up to the cd, whereas the

nnw

intention haa onl7 the

ontological movement to the end. Willing ..bat i . ordered for an end beeaWle ot
an onp.nal deaire otthat end, constitute. the ontologioal JIlw.ent.

W1lling

what 18 ordered. for an end together with an ex:pl1cit d.eaire at that end, em-

.titut•• ontolO£1oal and P87Chologioal aov_e.nt.
the next chapt.r that,

It ...i l l be ahom "'817 SOOIl in

tor St. !hca.as, this Oft'ologieal centlnnt,.- ot 1Il0tion

grounds the aoral 'Value of the Vin11&l intenttan.

Without this Woming of the

ilUan. b;y the end, .0 that a aan·. rill is cotolol1call,. borne to both t.he one
land the other, the theor.r of ft. Thaaa. on the moral influence ot the virtual
intention 18 unJustU1&ble.
In ....ary, tben, it baa beel aeen that the'rirtual intention of an end

Plalude. several charuter18Uc el_ent..

.....-

"'8011 haTing ordered

JH&Il8

32De Ver., 22, ,l.
~. lD II Sant., )8, 1, b. S.T., I-II, 12, 4•
....... .......-..
II lD II Sent., 16, 1, b, ad 2.

- -

and end
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in preparation tor the actual. intention, the ontological llod1f'ioation ot the
mean. by the end :reaa1ruJ when the att«ltion ot the intellect haa shitted tram
the end.

The cd and the act ot intention, nOlI' no longer t.he objects ot the

intellect t 8

gas.,

became speci•• :in the _01'7.

The will, ta1t.htul to its

natural dependeGe on the intellect, bueie. itself with the ..an. and 1d. th the

mean. to the•••eana.

lh do:lng

80,

howeYer, ita motion doe. not t.erminate

<mtologioallT in the ".a, but really embrace. at the .... till. the end.

CHAPTER IV
VIImJAL IRTEITIO}h ITS INFLUENCE 01 .A. MORAL Act

The preceding chapter haa explained the notion and the nature of 'firtual
intention.

Among the moat important element. in that type ot intention . s

found to be the matter-fom raJa tionsh1p of the Ileana 8'ld the end.

The present

chapter undertakes an expl&natiC1l of the intluence of the virtual intention on
a

man'" lIl0ral

acts, and will begin by showing the consequence. of that _.e

lIlS.tter-tom relaticnship.

thEIl the study will proceed to those clrcUllst;anoe.,

a.+ready noticed, which aocidentally affect the lIloral val.ue of an act.; namely,
attention and intensity. Finally the subject ot the renewal of the aetul intention avring to the 10s8 of that "force of the first intention" wUl be treated
to indicate why and when a renewal ot actual intention may be nece.sa;ry.
Once again the texts ot St. Thcmaa may

be a source ot difficulty. They

will often speak of such things as lIlent, grace, charity, venial and mortal sin.
The author of this thesis certainly would prefer to have nothing to do with
supernatural theology I but the texts ot at. Thomas have to be used.

The author

has tried to use only those texts which can allow ot some natural equivalent of
the supernatural matters contained therein.

Thus, venial and mortal sin DlIlY be

understood .s bad moral acts which, respective17, do not destro,- ordination to
the laat end and do destroy such order) meritoriousne.s in the natural order IU9
be under.toad a. the lIl0ral value ot an act which further. the agent
of natural beatitude. what is said of charity can be
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unde~.tood

t., worthiness

of natural chaJ'oo

6)
It7 ad aq otten be true of
~

Anytb.tD, a&1d ot

p~..

be Nduaecl to a nat1lnl appl,lo..t1ca, aDd
h~

urea

arace,

of oOlU"ae,

0 __

eo ten. 10 whioh Vd. reali')'fl....

have been aYo1ded. With thea. oautiClD8 1n m1ad, thm, \he . .lDa-

ti_ of nrtual 1ntentiClD oan continue.

!beN 1... tOJ'Ce frCIII .. t1nt iD'HDtlOD, It. 'lhaaa ..,.., wb10h can rema1D
in

,he action w1110h tollon. low 1t would . . . troa exper1ence tbat tb1s torce
~

1D GDe at twa wq8. either '0 that the

CD the JI88Zl8 wttb the
\0 the
GD

_O~I

wUl'. opent1OD aD

wm 1a OCl'l'UnUiq It.

attenticm of '-he iDtel.lee'

the mean'J or

the . . . ., without tbe ..".ticm

or

ao that the

acU.

'0 ilhe __ s cd

w1ll o-Un._ ita uUcm

\be intellect. Itt the latter

0"',

It 18

aUll , __ that the acent act. by tONe ot the • •ual in_Uon, but hi. aoUcma

ue cUTin alCl18 'iIler\lJ" or a1lbctoa.c1CNa17, or pe.1bap. b7 cHnt ot babit, 111
the eocuUQIl of the _UCla, N:tJ»r tbm with the . e....tlo JMt1cm of the to. . .

c....

!hu, tor 8UIlple, a prieat who 18 repeatmc ,h1a • .,.aa1al. prqer. or

pel'fON1D,

~oulv

ritul _tion.

OaD

e1tt.-r 'be JHQ1na 010•• at_'lento b1a
"

orde ed moU'*I, or hi. aiad oan ha.... wcdered

oA1'17 _ the

0'" bJ

ptq.~

eaapleUoa of hi.

clut1...

tar..-" le&Tinl

b1a habits

'0

In both ..... tbe uti. pro-

Yirtue of __ or1.1Dal 1nt.tlC1l m.ac1e 'b7 the prleat betore bel1nn1nc

tbe t'URCtloaa. . , ill contrast to the ._rl8\l8 pe1"4urance at the tonae of the
1D the at'kntt. . . .\11'1_, the ltOat that MIl be aa1d ot the 1u.ttentin

t7Pe of actiri_ 1e that. the aot1ClD It.elf 1, ordered to the end intended,
aot

eftA

tbe

be1rJ& act1vel¥ applied to that. action, wbUe the d1apoa1t1cm of

the will rem.ina the &181M ... bef.'ore nth regard to the md :Intended.
~t.. . .h
~rt

dUterencea, the aoral Talue of both the•• types ot acUon

__d b7 ... 'ri.rt.'u or tOl'O" ot an _twalinteotl_

a.

euetlJ equal,

9S.

itself, to the moral value of the I.e
[\iOl1.

acti~

it perfol'Md w1th an actual 1ntc-

• [1] n QllUbua _tibus mer:L torUa, qui ord1nantur ad fin. rectua, .nOll re-

,u1r1tur quod !ntentio &gentia ocmjUllptur tW, lecuncbmt qu.al.1bet act•• 86d
lYia pri.Jla, quae movet intentionem, manet in toto opere • • • et haae priaa ril

tacit tot_ OPUI mer:Ltori_, wl1nterrumpatv per contrariaa affection_, quae
diverut a tine praedicto ad finem oClltrarl:um.·1 IIlat auta triple x ettectua
oraticmil.

Praua quidela oamnuniIJ omnibus aatlbua carttate intomat1s, quod eat

rmereri_ it ad huDo etfect_ nct1 ex neces.itate requirltur quod attantl0 adsit
oratlcm1 per totum, led. ria primae intentlon1. qua al.1quia ad oranda &Ccedit,

rer1d1t tota oration. _r.t:tori8lltt slout

jn

&1.11, mer1ton1, act1bua accid1t.· 2

All that st. 'hamaa aqs in th.,. pas-S••, 1t i . true, is that the acUons
per.t01'lled with a Virtual 1Dtentioo ,are aeritoriwal be doea not MY that thq
equal the aoral wortk of the same actical perlol'lled With an actual. 1ntfl'ltlon.

But, arguing trca the fact that the

-n.

prima- II ,aid to reuin so as to haft

the . .e effect &II U 1t were still "aov1ng

~he

intention- and fraa ft. !beau'

teaching concern1ns the TaUdit,- of o.rtain ...oraents, 1t sa. . sate to aq
that the action per!omed in virtue or m actual intention of itaelt equala- the
value of the ..... acti<D under an actual intention (although accidentally, a.
11111 be seen, the latter can bave more value than the torm.r).
The reasons tor this are two. me en the part ot the w:l.11, and one on the

part or the object will.d, in this Case the means.

Both aspects bave alread7

been explained. The will continues its efficient motion, or at leaat retains

11

.!.2 .9.2£.,

c.

14, leet.)

2!_!., II-II, 8), U c.

(lied.).

6$
ta incl1natlO11 to the •.ul by not :1ntenclmc an oppoai te end. !he meana are ,tl
ol'll8d. b7 the cd, :lna__ h .. reason haa subordinated the .eana to the end
and. the will baa chosen the mean, so subordinated, With the ccnaequence that the
ot10l1 of the will to the meana c alBti tutes ontologically a sing.le motion direc-

ted to ...d _brac1nc the end alao.

lOW', a._sUm aris.8.

Sine.

~e

end Worms the means aa a result ot the

operat1C1'l of reason, 1t wauld seem that a un cannot act through the virtue of

. . . actual tntent:1C11 unl.sa he hael, at tbe tille ot the actual intention, fore..en every one of the anns he would emplor tor t he end intended.

For instance,

ti, betON the priest begins the functions tor a partieD r ceremony, he says to

hiluell, .'! want to pertorm these actions and 8"1' these prayers tor, this end.

(thanksg1vmg to God),· but omits to think apllc1tl;r

or

the preliminaries to

those actions ...."ld pra;ren, then he doe, not haT. a Y1nual :intention ot that end
en he carries out the prellld.nar1es, tor example, the washing ot h1s banda
betore he

ltepS

out to the place

ot worah1p.:. CCI'lSequently, his washmg of hands

will not have moral value b1 the virtue ot the' actual intention.
In an..,.r to thie, 1t aq be noticed that there are three poI.ible situa-

t10ns to wh1ch one can appl;r the worda actin,!!!!!.! T1rtaal. .1ntentiCl'l. In the
tiret. the agent 1a dealing with the immediate mean. to the end aetua.l.ly intended. ftte.. are the meana which :amet be ordered to the end in orcler tor t he actual intention to take place at allf the actual intention 18 ot an end to which

certain meana are ordered.

fhe carrying out

ot the.. _ed1at. means t 0 the

end, theretore, when done 'by'Tirtue ot the actual 1ntentiOD., constitutes the
t:1.nrt category, which

mar

be call.ed Clasa A, ot virtual intention.

~ple8

this s:1 tuat1fX1. are the following! a man who ha, just u.de up hi" mind to eat

ot
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.tart. making a sandwich for hilluselfJ a boy who has decided to pass a teetb,.
cheating beSins to wr.1te out a tiny crib-note, a man .tarting to pray tor a certain tavor (1ndeliberately) begin. to think

ot other things, though he cCXltinU.'

speaking the worda of the prayer.

The .econd aituatian occurs when a retrogressive aeries ot mean. to means
takes place, so that the :1Jmnediate means to the end actually intended becomes
it.eU the end ot certain Ileana, which in tum require certain media tor their
atta1naent, and so on.

Thus, a person desires to glority God (the end) by work-

ing tor people (the means).

Having concretized. the means by deCiding upon a

career in medicine, the person then decides for that end (being a doctor) to go
to school (the means).

In school, his stUdies become the end ot his daily sche-

dule, so that eating, .ocial lite, sleep, work, etc., are all ordered .. mean.
to the end that is stud;y. low, although in each successive step tbis aapiHl1t
to the medical profession actuall7 orders the means to the next proximate end,
he does not have an actual intenUcn of the o,riginal. end, but is acting with a
virtual intention of the original. end.

Hence," in thi. Class B ot virtual inten-

tions, many un1ts belcngiug to Class A appear, but eaoh unit not direotly related to the first end in the .eries canat1tutes an instanoe of a Class B virtual
intention of the first end.
Thirdly, acting with a virtual intention describes the situation in which
one makes .ome choioe lIhich, true enough, has been made tor same partioular,
proximate end, but whioh, logically, oould also be ref'erred to 8aas further,
lIore ultimate end.

For example, it a person chooses saae aotion which aocord8

wi th right reason (Say, eating tqperately to 0 antral hi. appetite), then he 11&7

be said to be virtually intending his proximate end, which is his human per.tec-
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!tiem and hi. laat end adJap17, which 18 glor11)1Dg God. Conyereel1', .ere b" to
~ODtrad1ct the

dlctat.. of reaeon dellberate17, be would Yirtual.l7 be int_ding

to renounce hi. own pertecUcn and the praise of Ood. this we of nrtuJ. initentl<1l, wb:loh

JIq be

called Clae. 0, dU'fers froa Clau B in that the litter

proceeda from. a pl'ft'1ou.alT placed actual 1ntcU<Il of au ult1aate end, and the

.eriea of IINDa-eIld relat1.. retrogre•••• tr<a that end b,. an interlinldng
oha1n. In Claa. C, the acUnt,. ea1d to be dOH With a nrtul 1ntentica doe.
~ot

proceed. .t:raa an actual 1I1tenUca ot a Jdgher end., but. 10li0all7 lead. to

.'DOb an 1ntCUCIl. 8uara, 111 OM work, diaoue ••• thi. t1P8

r.nth the actual, Yirtual, and hab1'w,
One IlUIIt noUce
third claa.

I..

~

and

ot intention aleng

cal.lat it the iDterpraUU",••)

-

the word Yir\ua11. not ueed :I.A the . . . . . . . in thi.
In thoee 1t meant tlbJ to:rce ot·J here 1t

in the firet two.

M8D8

Itpot,ential17-, Juat .. 81__t. are 8&id to be Y1rtuall7 in the cc.poun.da and an
act 1. aa1d to be Tlr1iull7 1n the habit. and pann•

.&.lao, it 18 good to notioe that the di."iDcUOl'l ..de prev1OW1l7 betw. . a

Y1rtul int_tim 11\ whloh the atteuUOD toe". on tbe uans, md one in which
the attentiem wanders

c~e~

three olaa... A, B, or C.

oft \be . .t'er at hand, oan tit &117

ot

the

ror 111 an7 action whioh pl'OOeeda trca a nrtual 1nte"

Ucn, the Il1nd can attend or not atted, W11:hout thereb7 ohan&1ng the nature of

the acUen.
D.l.Y1d:1ng the three

ola....

ot

'Y1r\ua1 intent!., tbln, with Clas. A and

Cla.a. B representing cae distinct group and Cla•• C anether, it can be seen that

the moral value'

3!! Ult1:llo

or action

!l!!,

II,

in

4.

ODe

group

1. net detel'llined. the . _ wq

&8

in the
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Regarding Class A there i. no difficult,..

Pertol'JliD.g the mean. with th

rtu.al intention of the end hal the . . . moral. Yalue aa if' the end were being
tually intended during the operation.S In regard to Cla•• B the an...er 1s the
Each succeeding choice andintention really .prings from and 1s directed

ame.

o the exactly same end that was originally intended.

It 1. not necessary for

e agent to consider at the time at the actual intention all of the links in
he chain of succeeding intentions.

J'rca his desire

or

this end, he wants these

eans. Wanting these, he directs his operations to the means ota tta1ning th_.
d
€I

80

Trae enough.. at any t1me he can recall if be

en.

80

wish.s the tirst end

intended and all the subseQ.uent steps, but this recall immediately link. the

eans at hand with the original end in an actual intention, not a virtual intenIn the words of

ion.

at.

Thomas concereing this second category of virtual

tention. "[O)u:nis f:i.nis a ratione deliberativ& intentus, pertinet ad boftua acuiue virtutis, vel ad malum alicuius vitii.

Nam hoc ipaum. quod al1Q.ui. agit

rdinate ad sustentatiooem vel Q.u:1.etem sui corporis, ad bonum virtutis ordinatur
"

eo qui corpus sum orclinat ad bonum virtuti...

Et idem patet in aliis_,,6

"Sic igitur. em allquis .eipsUlll ord1nat in Deun, sicut in finem. in onnibus q'Wl
ropter seipsUlft facit manet virtute intentio ultim1 finis. qui Dltue estt unde in

bus meren potest, si oariutem habeat. II 7

~ m.oral value il meant here not (Illy the speciel ot good or l?ad, but more
elpecially the degree or grade, if this way of conceiving might be allowed, of
oodne8. or malice_
5Cf.
6

~

!_!.,

IV ~.,

6, 1,

I-II, 18, 9 ad J.

7E! Carlt., 11, ad 2.

2, 1, ad

4J lS, 4,

2, J 801., and

4,

ad

4.

About 01aaB 0, St. 1ft.... baa nothing to . , unless one dtiaire, to call
the habitual mtentian a .ort of m:'erpretati.. mteDtian. 8 'erhap. the rea_on
i_ that the interpretative intention of u end does not have moral significaDO.

upon huun action. !'he taAtt that,

los1c~J

ultiute end 1V intend:1n& this or that

a mara i, intending a certain aore

".r.r prax1aate md doee not inltUft the

taot that be would. intend tha.t ultimate end if he bee... awa.re at i t l It hi.
[will. r-.ained !:1xed, then of cou.rse thatconclwCI1 tollare.

Jut un are often

"ohan&1nc the1r min.1I when they aee the lop.caJ. canaequenc..

ot their choia ••

and intentiQQ.8.

Theref'ore the only aorallt, tbat _tens into. oQlaid.eration of

Claes C nnw. intention perta1n. to it as an

an

end, taken e1'Uler aa an actual intentiOll in it.

ftn

of intction of a prox1aate

n,ht,

or .e an inataDce of

That 18, 1t that intentiOn be in cODtOl'll1ty with

Clue A virtual. intction.

the d:lc'kt.. of right reaBon, the in ten t.i.an i.t good J it a gainat riIht reason,

the int_tion 1a
~-.el.v••,

pad.;..; 1'beretOl'8

'and not accorcl:ir.la

1;0

thi.ola•• of act101l 18 judged ... units in

.mae higher ~1nt_tion which lIipt haYe beell

elioitecl.

CoDtol'lLi.ty to l"1aht l"Haon cClDatitute. the norm of all h~ aat1cm..10 It
~it1.a

.. 1004 or bad. e..J'7 volunt&r1 actiao, whether external or :Internal,

iwt&ether ot the iDtellect or of the will, whether choice, cOlmael, or 1ntenUon. t

8Althoqh the habitul 1ataU. 1Adioat.s "hat a un baa done lut rith
NCar<! to the ad, not what he rill do or a1ght clo.

9!!. !!l~. 2, 2, ad 91 -[I].. paitur aliq'" a Deo pro e. quod. tacturu
....t, sed pro eo quod tacit.-

lO!_I., l-1I, 18, 5 ., and 6 OJ II-II, 8, 6 OJ 47, 7 OJ 157, 2 c.
U ot•

!.!.,

I-II, 18, 9

0, 19, 1

ad 3_
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Iwvt.bele.s, :l.t 18 oOlUlected intimately with the act of mtention, tirat ot all

beeaWl. DO a,ct act. except tor some cd, eecoru:llJ beoaue an7 action Rat be
elther direotect or not directed to a due end. 12 Icoe, lt the intentioo which
aut precede ..,eFT actioo and whloh qualitie• ..... I'T actl00 ocmtoraa to right
re...on, the aoUCIl 18 good,. i t against right rea.on, the action 1. «:1.1.13
In another reIPHt alao the dictat.. of rigbt reason 0. . to bear upon

1I1tentian.

rea'«1,14

Sinoe me Datvall7 know that they are to act in accord with rlght
and inhlJUD action th81 rill be aware

i . contol1l1ng to righ' rea.on, a per8em will

toward or de.1ft of a

ot ..hether or not their utlen

mow ..ben

,hin, oan1'liau with a ••ire

his pre..nt diapoaitien

he has previOUsly elioited.

Thu., it a aan baa _de a lood 1ntenti01l ot a certain end, and nft, inl,dMli"l
with the . . . . to that aut, :I._ oontl"Ulted. with the opportunity to direct tbe

mean. to another cd whioh h.
e.

'hi.

man

i . OOl1tr&r7 to

end, that man thereb7 haa oonaciw.ll' ude

riabt
ail

rea8GB, and then oboo....

1n\enUan opposed to the

, tirat •• he • de. J5 Once he ha.' dme thi. J.le no longer pertol'lla acti-. b7

Yin...

"

of his tirat intentlm, but now hi. cOll'1'trarr actual tntctioa nppli••

the torce tel" all .ub......t &otion.

The torce of the orig1Dal. intent!CIl 18 broken, therefore, by at intentlcm
of a oontr&r7 .uh by an

~tent1OA

of an end oontrary to riaht reason it the

tin_.-

l2lbid., 18, 9 c t Bee•••• e.t aut. quod .el ordin'tur, .,..1 non ordinetur
ad debit,.

i.,

1l0ood Or ft":I.l, that
80 tar .. 1tl moral 'f'alua in the
Ct. !.!., I-II, 19, 8 ad 1; 21, 1 c.
'

concerned.

.ye.

ot Ood 1s

14!-I-, Il-II, 47, 7 c.
15Th1• 1. not to 11&1 that a Il8ll needa to desire the contra17 end a& 80m. .
thing bad tor him..lf; thi& 1s a psychological impossibility. De fer. 22, 1 ad 6
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original 1ntentiCll'l were goodJ b;y intending an end according to right rea.on, 1£
1t were bad. 16 On the other hand, the toree ot an original good int_t1on is
aeral7 l'Cldered t_porar1l.7 inoperative in those ea••• in whioh a man act. eontrary to riPt reason, but without being consc10us

or

the end.

Th. un not

haT1n, adVerted. to the end.. hi. aotion 1. CCI'ltrary to the good. end 1n t&ot,17

while hi. will aubject;1Tel7 reaiD. t&1thtul to the end.

·[Q)uod en1m . .tur in

peeoat.....:l.all.. propter De_ ....tv habitu, etai non actu ••18 "f.I]lle qui
peeoat nm.1aJJ.ter, iDhaeret bono t8llporal.1 Dm ut trueD., quia non oonstituit
in eo fin_. aed. lit utena, reteree in De... nOD utu, sed hab1tu.,,19

instanoe. the choice baa

DO

aoral

ww~

In auoh

trca the orig1nal good 1ntmt1an, tor

:l.t doea not tall \II1dar that 1Atentian.. but stands by 1t.elf .. an act··ot _lice.

1ri.t17, me lo.e. pera_ent17 \he ettic..,. of a

,ood actual intentiCl'l b,.

a del1beratel:y e1:1e1ted ocmtrary intenti., eIle taporar1l7 loae. :l.t. ettieac:y
8ft

pertomlq an aotian whioh objeotlTe17 oppoaalthe good _41 1nt_ded but :I..

ot cana:1derec:l 1n relation to the en4.
Ua, e.t

gran_

""e~io.

peecat_ quod ..t ex certa

paceato quod eat _ pal.1One, quia ill. q1d. peeoat ex oerta

Ua, eat ule d:1.pos1tue quant-ma all :l.p. . tinea, qu:1 e.t principla in
erab1l1bua. it aic 81U1 detanus eat per1cnil.oaior quua e1uI q1d. ex pas.iODe
oat, cu1ua propoe1tua tendit in bon_ tin., 1:1oet hoc propoaita interl'l8p6-

v ad h01"8Dl prepter pauion_.-2Q

-.1'., n*n,
-19!.!.,
88, 1

161 ad Cor., 14, 3 (med.).
17Kutat1. mutandis i f the original intention 1. a bad eme.

18 5

24. 10 ad 2.

I-II,

20

ad

3.

I

I
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The aoral Tuue
.aid,

or

or

action performed with a TirtWll. intention, it haa beat

itself equal. the moral Talue ot the .... actiCll performed 'With an

actual intention. lor what reaaon, then, doe. lit. !hCllaa seaeu.e. indicate a
preference tor an actual intention over a T1rtual intention'ln One 81'u,..er 11es
in the subtle infiuence

or those two factors of attention and intensity.-2 2 In

the Urst chapter both of these tactora were deser1bect.

There it was seen hOll'

the intena1t7 of 8D."¥ operatiCll of the eoul held \be attention captive, and hOll',
on the other hand, att_'!m m1ght inctaoe create intcait)" •

Whatever the dit-

ticulty in d1.UapJ..h1n& between the two in a giTll1 action, it would .ean upon

-al¥8is that the etteot ot attending to an.'. aot1aa23 i. to raise the probabilit;y of Ca) recalling \he original end inteded and thus repeating the actual
inttnt1C1'l, (b) elicit1n, other pl'ai.ewor1h7 d••ires . . ..ted by" the mean. (upon
..hiGh, properq, one i . actina when

CDe

has a virwal. intention at the end).

lh:Ue the intellect 1. distracted there 1. li ttl. chane. ot JlBJdn! deliberate

rnu act..

'lb. effect of intensity would be ,to delq the gradul

1088

of the

toro80f the actual intention and to fort1t7 oile'. present inclina.tion of the
a ••

ut

21S.~ III, 64, 8
aU_

ad

3t

teQwun1.. etucl1... OuraN debut I&CNaenti a:lni.ter
l! IV .!!!!i., 6, 1, 2, 1 ad 4.

aCtual. intention. adhibeat." Al.o,

22A. aore obYioua an_v 1. that the

oI)j8Ot. wh1ch cae iIltends can make the
act of Jntending more pertect. The h1cher the end intended, the better the
aotul lntent1011. 8o,:lD Tirtual activity that "'817m. carri•• on dq in and
da;y out (th. Clue» type), people are makinl numeroua actual intentions. But
thq (the actual intentioaa), though aade b;y Tirtue ot . . . preY10ue actual
intention of a la8t end, are le•• morally Taluable thu. i t the laet end were ~
ob3..t of 'tho.. intent1•• , and not ••• praximate ends.
-

23Th1a 18 of CJ.aa• .A and ala••• Tirtual 1.ntaticn now that thi. 1. . . .1;
to be spoken.

will,24 thu red_ina the chanee. for a chan.. in one'. intention. fiDall)' ~

coune, attention wo\1ld praaote inten.lt;y and

no.

Tersa.25

Reno. it 18 aore d••irable to perlors attenu'Tel7' \h. action one ia per-

forming with a Yirtual intention, than to pertora 1 t d1etract.dl;y. lot that the
latter po.se.... 188. aoral Talue than the t01'ller, ocml1dered a. under a Yirtul
intention. ht in the tormer eil"Cl:1Dl8hnce the agent i . aore prepared to pertON.
other aoral.l7 Taluable act.t and, in particular, to repeat the act of actual

tnt_tlem, which, .1rhc repeated, u;y likel;y be u.d.e aore 1nt-ael7. 'Ja1larl;y,
,
it 18 80re de.irable to have an actual intention ot the end to lIhich <me i .

di:rectinl one'. action., than to haTe merely a 'Yirlual iDtenticm. !ctim which
is actual.ly referred to the end i . preferable to the . . . action don. with a
Y1riual intention 'beeaue ill the latter ca". on.'. cbaoe. of eont1Du.d, caple-

--tarT, cmaeqv.ent, ad reiterated utiCD. cleere.....
tiTe

~

diat.racted

Likew1.. , in the atten-

of action with a Yirtual tntentim the chllilc •• are great.r than in the

we, whil. there 1a the con.-tant:, danpr,

in the di.tracted t)'pe, of

lo.ing the tONe ot the virt\1&lintenUon alt$pther.
It.

~au.s

warn. of this danpr. "It siout Tirtu aoU.OIl1. priaae oontinue

debU1tatur, ut quudoque lapis 1ap'tllaua qute..at, Yel cOIltl'U'iO aoclo Ilcnatur,
nisi :Lt. . . iapellatUl", ita, ut dicit AlIIutau, 'a em. 'Yitae _aiden_
quodam9do tepeac1t. It ideo certi. horis ad Depti_ orandi _nt_ I'ft'ocaaua,

24!!. III Set., 11, 2, I, ad 1. ·IDtentio aut. et d1r1g1tur et azoiutur
et roboratur ei'lii'.,eot:Lone alic~U8 exaaplari., in quo t1n1. secundum l'OII prucadat. Undo aicut 1I1tetio noatra qua intendillu8 in gloria
excltatur
ex inapeet1on. div:1nae ,lona. quae •• t ex_plar Doatrae beatitud1n1a tuturaeJ
ita •••••

anima.,

ISIn oonneottion with thi. and the next paragraph the follOldng article. are
eapeciall;y pt!rtin81tl S.T., I-II, 19, 8 OJ 20, 3 OJ 20. k c.

14
• deaider1_ QUod t.epeecere incepen:', amino trige.cat. ... 26 In the next Solu-

ian he repeate \he not.ion that ane'. at'Mntian remain• .,.1rtWlll:T in ene'.
1'&781', ..,.en 1t in the proce.s of the pr.,.r one beoca•• di.tracted.

Ha conti-

ue. wiih the caution hanTert -[1]181 tanta r1at ""agatio, quod amn1no depereat
8

pl'1laae int.ent:1m1..

ae1p_ ••17

Et ideo oport.et quod frequenter h(llo 001" NYooet ad

tberaf'ore a man

C6Jl

be deprived ot 'the moral Yalue of .cae good

utual 1uUctionl he oan 10" the torce ot t.he orig1Dal int_t1aa. fo prevent.
hi. eituaUon frODl happening, and to r_ecb' it if' it ahould happen, he baa to

renew hia act.uJ. 1ntentian •
. Theoret1cal.ly, renewal is unneoe.dl"7. theoretically_ !bat. 1., acoording
o the· nature of virtual intention it would .eem autf'1c1ent. tor a per.on to 1Dtend . .e 111 bia We .. lut end ot bis _tioo., and per.f'ora trca then on &1.1 ot

• ut1oa. dh a virt'U&l1ntention ot that end without eYer haYing to

reD...

that ut.ual intent.lon to "urit by it.. !hie lqpothaad.. ot cour.e i. salt-de.true

'1"'.,

be.idee presupposing a man po.... sed

re natuall7 capable of g.tting alan.g .0

re lfOuld be no logical
in, his waking hove.
i

:re-..on wbT

or,

preternatural power.

...n .. not ever to

1'01'

11" a aan

.in mortal.l)r, th

bit intentian would c.... to be actul dur-

lor no pa.sim. or other tactor. would prennt hi.

-'"%7 act cCIlacioul7 to God,

orde~

and he could ...117 attend to thi. ordering ..

11, ha'ring . . actual. order to Ood 1n all of hi. . ."1eas. Thus, the Te17
••ib111'\7 ot Yinu&1 1ntenticm waald diaappear in auoh an

h1P~e.u.

Looking at un &8 he 1., theraf'ore, r8llft&l. of hi. actual intentim of hi.

26J! IV

-

21lbicl.,

1m,., lS,
4

aal.

4,

2, ) aol.

7S
p.&st end is nece.8&1'7 tor h1Il either to restore the eubordination at hi. action
to the laet end i t that Subord1natian haa been loat, or el.. to make that ,ubordination more 8011d.

Renewal i8 adYantageous, al,o, tor

b,.. it

one reatore.

tervor into one's action., thu adcl1ng to their moral Talue.
The l'MIICIls why renewal i, practically necessary are aa old as man since

Adsta'. tall.

Passions, ignorance, assertion

or

selfish pride, the bad habit.

consequent upon theae, etc .-they all lead a man .....,. trca actiCll consonant with
a good actuall,.. intendedrend.

-Cum aut_ aliqu:1s non utitur habitu rlrtutis ad

IIOderandas paasiones vel operatione. propriaa, nee.sse est quod prOV'enit.nt mul-

tae paalJ1,one. et operationea praeter modm virtuU8, ex mclinatime appetitua
sen.1UTt, et al10rum quae exter1u. lIlovent •..2 8 ·(r~lllando 1n.f'eriores potentiae

iTeheaenter atticiuntur ad sua obiecta, eonsequen. eat quod superiore. Yirel
:lmpediantur et deord1nentur in' atds actibua. Per vitium. auts luxuriae max:1ae
appetitua interior, scilicet eoncupiscibili., vehementer tntendit

1U0

Obiecto,

ICmeet de1ectabili, propter vehalentiam clelactationi.. It 1deo consequens
est quod per l'l1XUriam maxime superior•• viree "deordinentur, scilicet ratio et
yolunt... • 29 !he very external acta which men have to perform can lead them.
-Quod autem, huiU81llodi ban. al1quis intendat ut in pluribus qu1bu. priV&

astray.

times bali secundum rationem cO%lsequuntur, ex hoc proven1t quod plures viTUnt
secundum sensum, eo quod aena1b1l1a aunt nobis manifesta, et magi. eff1caciter

lIo'Vent1a 1n part1cularibus, in quib'l18 est operatio.")O As a matter or tact, in

28

!.!.,

I-II,

53, 3 c.

29!.!., II-II, 153, 5 c.
)O£.~.. III, 6,

Ct. also I-II, 109,

8 c.

16

&.t)

t;he natural order wimpoaa1bUe

Ie.",

hoarl.n_ semper vel diu in tanta vigilant1&

quanta ac1 hoc .nqu1ritur propter mul:\a in qui:bus mens hom:L'lis oceupatnr,.JJ

~8re "ad hoe" refer, to
~reak

the &Toidance of giVing con.ent to something 1f'h1ch w1ll

ott bi. ord1Dat1on to

hi. good end.

In the li&ht of all the.. w1ldeal. faoton, then, it 18 olear why a nan who

want. to pertoa ao1"&ll7 l'aluab.le act. DftI.I;t rena hi. actual intenticm I both to

rut... hi, ord1natiClO \0

hi. proper end ehould he have tallen from that ordi."la-

t1m) ad to pl"ft'Cl' b1qelt fraa approaching too clangel"OUll7 nea:r a fall.

reaaal 18

bElD;8l1.1~

bh

tor prepar1ng a . . to 1ricrease b1 • •orally valuable acta,

it not. tbroap 1Dcreaa1ng the 1nt8'la1t;r of the repeated int81tion and the action

tollowml, at leaat throaah the tact that two act.. ot utual int.slt1cn are
better \haD. _ .

How ott. In int.en tlea ahould be renewed 1, neYer determined by St. Thomaa.

aaoe,

la.eYer, he . . . . t.o indicate the an...r, 'but .1n real1t,. he haa only

pJuw,eed the pro'bl_.

"It a1 quaeratur quando oporteat aotua reterre

;re....

in .tinea

11l1i1a_, .boo D1hU al1ud .~ , . . quaerere quando aportet habitua char.t.tatia ex-

11"8 1n ..tal qu1a ,_docn••_ habitue c.bar1taUa in ICtla exit, tit ordinatio

toU.ua hCllD.1n1. ill fill_ ulUDwa, et per oOQlquen. aanita eorum quae in ips.
ol'tiDantur ut bou ab1. wl2 All he i. eapcg 111 that
intcUon of the lut eacl wh_

CIle

0118

II\UIt l18ke an actual.

baa to d.o . .ething aetuall7 tor that end.

ht it -.01:Ild .... obvloua that no definite indication of tille or t11lea c .
be

Ii"" to

the

..,.u<m.

lirat of all, lI!l\1Ch de~ _ CIne's purpose.

,ue-,1on 18 ..ow otten .houlcl a man renew

--

'iDe Ver., 24, 11 c.
3!In II Sen,., 40, 1, S,

- -

ad

6.

aD

If the

actual intention or his la.t end in

17
order to avoid loain, it. f01'Ce'," the ,eneral an...r mut come in tem. of the

individual

f.

own

,.ad paat experiellce.

al an_r muat ap1n caae in term.

It "Bow otten to be perfect."" the gener-

or the

indiv1d.ual t • habit., occuplt1ona, viI'-

Diaappointing .. euoh a geaeral an....r mq be to ln700e

tu., taperament.

eeekiIl, def1n1te eolutiOl'18 to _ery probl_, the tact raaina that a definite

.olution cannot in this oaae be p.TeI1. At

In:';

rate, 1t ...... not

g!Tetl b)"

st.

Th....
this chapter, tbeD, dealing with the moral influence ot a virtual intention
upon uUon pertor.med with a v1rtualintentica, ",an

ot the matt8J'looofom relat1onah1p .et

b7 noting the oontinuance

up in the actual intention.

natian 01 attentive and dia\r8Gted Yirtul intention, followed

or

After an expla-

'b.r a diatinction

thne ola.... of Y1rtualintenUon, it ....... that MUon under a true

Y1nual iIltentiOll

Cu

oppoaed to :tnterpNtat:lve in_1;1on) hu the eae moral

Talue aa ..t1011 1Ilu:ier an Mtual iIltllltion. .At th1apo1nt the dilOwud.on ot the
iIlterpret&Uve

~

of vinual1ntmti.

ledJl&t~

to a briet consideration

of the idea of oonf01'll1t;y to right rease, whibh in tU'l"D pointed OIlt hOW'the

:1Jltl1J.eCe of a or.l.c:tnal1atentic can

c.....

lext, the JIOd11)ing :tnnuenoea ot \

atUntian ad. :tnt_ei"7 helped to expla.1a the preferab1l1 t;y of .. actual intention OYer a 'rirtul intention, ad. of

lID

attentive MUon ewer a d1atracted

.. Uan. .rinlll)", the :re. . . . whioh JUke renewal of an actual intention nece...
8&1'1 aad deairable were to\lDd in the lnaan elal_t, an anner whioh at the . . .

t t . rules out a D__ neal _anI' regard1nC the tnqv.nC7 of renewal.

r

A

sreat deal

of contueiQD. can tur!"ound the teNs

tenU. and 9,p.bltJ!!!

cU.na each
UIIq8 of

i!!en'!~.

~t-t ~Wn~OD. ~

!he major part IJ! the d.1t.t1Gul:G7 1n _c:le1"-

of the thNe and in diating-cl1.nina <r1e

t.fmu and fl'Ql the oaapla1ty of h1lUn

.trc:a the

0.........

trca

at;l tion.

!el'lll8. Tel'lU overlap. .An ac1»uaJ. 1ntmt1()lt can be habitual. (....ung cutn:.aa.I

) md virtual intentlcn "an be habitual. fhe c. . of a .benai.' aoak who 18

at ocmt:1n1lO'Uly uld.nc actual intention. ot a

e.~

_d Ulunratea tbe

rat 111tuat.1cn, fIDel the cue of a holy urried man who repeat. h1a actual. 1DUcm8 at

~

1ntreq\Wl1t inte"ala Ulustrate. the I8CODd.

1a'lenUcma ...

nrtuall.7 11'1

fbe apiD, . t......

the will 1I'h1ch baa an bab!tu.al 1r1Mott_.

......

Jae. the noUcm of ri.rtual in'.tlcn oan be·· ~tended to aiani1'7 what ,"- ~
Oau.clllow an interpretative intention, but wbLeh wae no1. eo n.ed 1D 'the

t It. !boua.

On the ota.. 1814, •• '!hema. sOQet:imea let tbe word .,,.~ in-

01. both actual act
,...............
tl1B
.........
l

FtowlS.

....~ lI1l1leacl

da7

ODe

~18l.

mtent1m. l1n&lll' j the ue of ••h phraa•• as

c4 ~1'~

t!rl&.':*,

and aven ~~~ d;t.P?fi1.UQtl, ean

tnto • wrona oonoept.1C11 of the nature of bab1tual1nt.entlcm..

Partly _cour.rUn, tor th.1e overlapp1n,g 18 the cuaplexit1 of tniaanarU.OIl.

Ul.1nc • tor 3-an

actual 1n~t1co-1• •imple enough to deacrlbe.

Wi.l.l.1na f

or. (tor Z)-a 'Ytrtv.al mtfmt1t.Z'l at Z-mvolws also an ac~U&l. 1ntcUcn ot ".

one om pel'f'oa ! (lor. tor Z), in which cue one's actual inWn U<I1 ot \1'
78

79
hal ceued '.eaUil. of d1etract.cIn•••, md. 8T.r;yth1ng i . being d.one with a Tir-

tuaJ. intention.

JlII:ll7 h__ .UtIl, honver, beo . . . .uoh

tM. skel.tal piot"". IDteaUOIlII toUow

OJMI

caapl1cated. than

1I0re

uP_ _ oth.r 1D rapid ••c...iCID.

8cae ot th. _cla :lAteluted. are .ubord1Dated. to others, . . . are ooordiDate thoqh

enntall7 subordinated to

lID

identical high.r

_el, ... are in:t_clecI toanner

in cae ut ot the will. "'ttenUGIl c . . . and gou, 1Dteaa1tJ

a_

ptOII'II and.

lalter••

all1. take into "C01II1t, 1t bee. . . olear that it i. tar eui.r to know

the nature ot tba three t7P8. of 1n*Uon tUn to be able to aq 111 a par\1oular ginn in"_ce whioh of

the three

t,.,..

On. probJ.-. which t ...UD~ arl••• 1D

of

1Dt.Uon i . had.

recard. to the 81IbJ- ot

Yirtual

1Dter1t1on .CIIOeme the IIOral yala of oer\a1n MUo:n.. wb1ch ••• cOllpl.te1.7 a

..tter of habit. the tollGId.D, 11&7 ...,.. a.

811 . . .pl., & . .

_ten a oh'tU'Oh

and &lIt. .t1calq eros•• h1uel.t and. genuflect•• Or, a blaho, Ph.iD, a crowd

autouticall7 uk•• the e1p .t the orOla OYer th.. fald.Dg a aiwaUcn maide
the rel1g1oaa . .ere, OIle nader. about ItlIGh. &.t. .tic gestlU"8fl u leering a
.,

tip,

OJ'

ala'.

ahakJ.nr, handa, or paaaing

nat

a greeting. " Do th... aetlC1ft8 haft .oral

Jd.Dd ot :lDt_tian 40ea the &pat han'

Th. fir" aWp in an...nng the quatlOD II1gbt well be to aale wh.th.r or
the.e utian. are .. capl.t.ly _oonecioWl u the word. autoaatio lJ\1gge.t ••
U the naatic. are

DO

1I0re than the .tbnalua ad reapGll" ftriet7, the nch

tlO1l. can be .et aleapicle th. • atro1d.Dg of cae

st. Th.u the ut. ot a

JUJl . .

ie i . Dot to b. tak_ too

t.

opposed to h__ ute. But i t the word autau-

.V1c~,

th_ the aeooad atep aaturallJ . . . . to be

o ct.tera1ne whether the aoUOIl were pe.rtOZ'Md. with
t'tlll 1Dt_tlon.

fha, bonY.r,

beard" which _plUl.. tor

i_ to pose a talae

aD

habitual or with a 't'ir-

,._Uoa, tor the

babi'ual

r

80

intention has

alreaclJ'

be_ ruled out, _1••• OIle ie re.terr1ng to eOlle ad not

.OUCht in the action it..u.

the habitual iDtentiOl1 belonal to a un

_til

he i.

Dot pertOl'JliD1 hUUD . t.....in other worda, stiIIulue and reaponae reacUoua are

done with an b.ab1tllAl intention (ot the last end, or a prox1aate ad, bU not 01

-

the eel ot the aat itlelt. 1n eUatal.. md ftapGll" ..UTi.. no int-'1_ 1.
utual.l7 ude).

"Bab1t1ilal1ter eaUa retert in De_ et qu1111h1l q1t, nee
aliq:l1d actual1ter 1ntend:1t.·l

lather, it thoae ·aut. .tlo" ,"turea de.scribed in ths

.u.......t

of the

proble involve .oae 0_801oqns.8 GIl ths part of the agat Mel thue are 80re

tnq

h--.n action, the proper qtaest:1ca Ihould be whether the acti_ 1. doI1e

wi\h a virtual or

aD

_t.val. intention. Jow, aocordiBg to the detiJlit1C1l of a

h-.. acti_, the agent JIUI1; have . .s end in view. 2 !hefttore, in tho.. 88te,
at lead

aD

a nul. 1Dtantion ot .eae _d, h .....er proxiaate, . . . be present.

It ..,. be that • v1rt.ual iDt_tion ot .GIle more ul.Uaate ad. can al.o be

buted to \h. agent.

at~

It..,. al.o be 'ru, .. aJ.reaq .ta\ed, that the agent hal

an habitual. 1n'-ntion of . . . di.t.ant ad, tor exaple, it the ....11&1'. 1nt4lnUca.
nre a Jd.nor 4.eord1natiOl1 trca rilbt

re&8OD.

But i t the "aut.. .tic· PtAure•

.... at all eonaeioll,q pl..ed, the the &pDt a118' have had . . . utual intenti_ whc he b8,an the.

Another of the aaJor Fobl. . eormeo'ed with the 81lbjecrt. of iAt.ct.1on has
- alreadiJ bee u8ll'4lred.

This probl_ ask, h_ often a penCIl ehCNld rea.- hi.

lin Dna].

~ ~., 11, adj. That ia, "nee aliquid actuallter 1nten.dit
2a•f ., I-II, 1, ) at w(A] ctU8 die_tv hmlanl, inquant_ proced1mt

a volUDta's cieaberata. Ob1ec1;_ autem voluntatia eet bon_ at finia. It ideo aaDifeatua .at quod prineipiua hlB8l1ol'Ulll actu_, inquantUII aunt h1JllUm1, eat tini•• •

81
actual intention ot the last end, the euppoe1tion being, of ooure., that an
actual intention of the lut end 1ebetter thin a n.rtual intention of the ....
end and certainly better than an actual intent1e1l 01 all le...r ends. fhe an...r ginn preY10U8ly indioated that renewal of a good intent10n 1. neoeea&r1
atter the good int_t1on baa been deetro;yed by an actual. 1ntantiCll of an end
contrary to r:I.cht reaeCD, provided the person daurea to perform moral.l.1' worthwhile act.. If

ell

the other hand the per.em <le81re. to prevent tbe 10.. ot the

toroe ot the actual intention, then be au.t be content, ae wae aa1d, w1 th a

general nora.

ulanew your utual intention of the l&8t end otten becaae you

never oan tell when you II1gbt find ,-ouraelf oppoeing 1t deUberately." How
otten 1a otten1 How long &so 1.

Ju~

in sucb

phr....

ae t "... I Jut mentioned

above·) "Preaidelt &!lith Juet died", "I Just read acanhere"? It 1. up to the
ind1v1dul, ha'f'1ng UDderetoed the imporlance of a riiht intent1on, the

Wtq

in

whioh 1t 1s lost, and t1e reaeon. wIV 1t 1s lon, to detendne tor h1maelt what
the word

~en

lIan7

will ...an in the ocr.rtext ot

~.

peraoaal 11te.

'.
other probl... botober the aoral1.t in ccxmecUQl with the act ot in-

tention. !he.., howeYer, peri&1n to an aepeet ot the subject whioh did not
allow ot trea__ t in the prelent study J namel;y, the question ot a ,good or a bad

intention. In JIaD7 wqs the probl_ which &1"1•• trca thi, question are tar
aor. delicate than the task of di.t1nglti..hing the three type. of intentiw, and
perhap, thie expla1na ... the medieval philosopher-theologian, were more pr....
occupied with tho•• problema)

82
A. tor what CCDoem. the nature of the act ot intention, however, and the

diUerence between each ot the three types of intention diaoueaed by St. Thomas,
it is hoped that this study has .et all the signifioant probl.s and an....red
th_ nttiaiently.

Or, it not, at leaat tha't1t has prori.ded the correct baaio

analya1 • .fraa which can be drawn 'the solutions to more apee1t1o probl. . .
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